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FDIC Office of Inspector General, Office of Material Loss Reviews, Report No. MLR-10-008,Material Loss Review of Great Basin Bank of Nevada, Elko, Nevada, December 2009


FDIC OIG Executive Summary


Material Loss Review of Great Basin Bank of
Nevada, Elko, Nevada
  Report No. MLR-10-008
December 2009
Why We Did The Audit

On April 17, 2009, the Nevada Financial Institution Division (NFID) closed Great Basin Bank (Great Basin) and named the FDIC as receiver. On June 5, 2009, the FDIC notified the Office of Inspector General (OIG) that Great Basinís total assets at closing were $228.8 million and the estimated material loss to the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) was $39.4 million. As required by section 38(k) of the Federal Deposit Insurance (FDI) Act, the OIG conducted a material loss review of the failure of Great Basin.

The audit objectives were to (1) determine the causes of Great Basinís failure and the resulting material loss to the DIF and (2) evaluate the FDICís supervision of Great Basin, including the FDICís implementation of the Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) provisions of section 38.

Background

Great Basin was a state-chartered nonmember bank, established by the NFID and insured by the FDIC on July 29, 1993. The institution was a full-service community bank with four branch offices and was wholly owned by a one-bank holding company. Great Basin had no subsidiaries or affiliates. The institutionís loan portfolio included, but was not limited to, out-of-territory purchased participation loans from areas that experienced a significant economic downturn starting in 2007, and a concentration in commercial real estate (CRE) loans. Great Basin also invested in securities including, but not limited to, Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) securities.

Audit Results

Causes of Failure and Material Loss

Great Basin failed because its Board did not ensure that bank management identified, measured, monitored, and controlled the risk associated with the institutionís lending activities. Specifically, Great Basinís Board and management failed to adequately assess the risk associated with expanding the loan portfolio through purchases of out-of-territory participation loans, particularly from 2006 through 2008. The bank also lacked effective risk management controls for its CRE loan portfolio. Additionally, poor risk management practices negatively impacted the bankís ability to effectively manage operations in a declining economic environment.

The weaknesses in Great Basinís loan portfolio were exacerbated by a downturn in the bankís market area and out-of-territory locations. Declining earnings, resulting from high provision expenses for deterioration in the loan portfolio, severely eroded the bankís capital. Additionally, losses associated with FNMA securities contributed to inadequate capital levels and reduced earnings. The NFID closed Great Basin due to the bankís Significantly Undercapitalized position.

The FDICís Supervision of Great Basin

The FDIC and NFID provided ongoing supervision of Great Basin and performed six on-site examinations from June 2002 to January 2009. The FDIC also performed offsite monitoring in 2008 that resulted in a downgrade to the institutionís ratings. The joint examinations included concerns and recommendations regarding weak risk management practices related to purchased participation loans and CRE loans, and loan underwriting and credit administration deficiencies. Examiners also reported apparent violations of law and contraventions of policy






Executive Summary Material Loss Review of Great Basin Bank of
Nevada, Elko, Nevada
  Report No. MLR-10-008
December 2009

associated with the institutionís lending practices. During the February 2008 examination, the FDIC and NFID recognized the significance of the bankís increased risk profile due to the increase in purchased participation loans and made several recommendations to improve the bankís monitoring and due diligence practices. Beginning in July 2003, and as the institutionís condition deteriorated in February 2008 and January 2009, the FDIC and NFID took enforcement actions to address identified deficiencies.

The FDICís supervisory and enforcement actions issued in July 2008 and April 2009 addressed most of the deficiencies at the bank. However, the action taken in July 2008 did not require Great Basin to obtain qualified management, a significant factor in the poor oversight of the purchased participation loan portfolio. Further, significant deterioration in Great Basinís asset quality had occurred before these actions were taken, and the effects of poor risk management practices, purchased participation loans, and the CRE concentration had significantly impacted the institutionís financial condition, in general, and loan portfolio, in particular. Further, although the FDIC and NFID took action after the February 2008 examination to address the bankís deficiencies, bank management continued to purchase participation loans, increasing both the bankís risk profile and the probability, and ultimate realization, of significant losses to the institution.

With respect to PCA, we concluded that the FDIC properly implemented applicable PCA provisions of section 38 based on the supervisory actions taken for Great Basin.

Management Response

After we issued our draft report, we met with management officials to further discuss our results. Management provided additional information for our consideration, and we revised our report to reflect this information, as appropriate. On December 2, 2009, the Director, Division of Supervision and Consumer Protection (DSC), provided a written response to the draft report.

DSC reiterated the OIGís conclusions regarding the causes of Great Basinís failure. DSC also stated that Great Basinís Board and management were expected to identify and control the third-party risks arising from the relationships for its purchased participation loan portfolio. With regard to the FDICís supervision of Great Basin, DSC stated that examiners identified the risks associated with the purchased participations in 2008 as weaknesses in the bankís loan underwriting and credit administration became apparent. DSC further stated that the FDIC has issued guidance which outlines the basic elements for effective third-party risk management and for the performance of due diligence on purchased loan participations.




















Contents

Page
Background 2
Causes of Failure and Material Loss 3
Board of Directors and Bank Management Oversight of Operations 3
Asset Growth Through Purchased Participation Loans Between 2006 and 2008 5
CRE Loan Concentration 8
Adversely Classified Assets and Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses 9
Investments in FNMA Securities 10
The FDICís Supervision of Great Basin 11
Supervisory History 11
Consideration of Risk Presented by Great Basinís Purchased Participation Loans 13
Supervisory Response to Great Basinís CRE Loan Concentration 15
Sufficiency and Timeliness of Supervisory Actions 16
Implementation of PCA 17
Corporation Comments 18
Appendices  
1. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 19
2. Glossary of Terms 22
3. Acronyms 24
4. Corporation Comments 25
Tables  
1. Financial Condition of Great Basin 2
2. Great Basinís Percentage of CRE Loans to Total Loans Compared to Peers from December 2003 to December 2008 8
3. Great Basinís Adversely Classified Items and ALLL 10
4. Examination History of Great Basin from June 2002 to January 2009 12
5. Great Basinís Capital Ratios 17
Figures  
1. Great Basinís Asset Growth Rate Percentages Compared to Peers 6
2. Great Basinís Purchased Participation Loan Balances as of November 30, 2008 14











FDIC, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of Inspector General,  3501 Fairfax Drive, Arlington, VA 22226-3500
DATE: December 4, 2009
 
MEMORANDUM TO:Sandra L. Thompson, Director
Division of Supervision and Consumer Protection
 
FROM:Stephen M. Beard [Electronically produced version; original signed by Stephen M. Beard]
Assistant Inspector General for Material Loss Reviews
 
SUBJECT: Material Loss Review of Great Basin Bank of Nevada, Elko, Nevada
(Report No. MLR-10-008)
 

As required by section 38(k) of the Federal Deposit Insurance (FDI) Act, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted a material loss1 review of the failure of Great Basin Bank of Nevada, (Great Basin), Elko, Nevada. On April 17, 2009, the Nevada Financial Institution Division (NFID) closed the institution and named the FDIC as receiver. On June 5, 2009, the FDIC notified the OIG that Great Basinís total assets at closing were $228.8 million and the estimated material loss to the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) was $39.4 million.

When the DIF incurs a material loss with respect to an insured depository institution for which the FDIC is appointed receiver, the FDI Act states that the Inspector General of the appropriate federal banking agency shall make a written report to that agency which reviews the agencyís supervision of the institution, including the agencyís implementation of FDI Act section 38, Prompt Corrective Action (PCA); ascertains why the institutionís problems resulted in a material loss to the DIF; and makes recommendations to prevent future losses.

The audit objectives were to (1) determine the causes of the financial institutionís failure and resulting material loss to the DIF and (2) evaluate the FDICís supervision2 of the institution,


1 As defined by section 38(k)(2)(B) of the FDI Act, a loss is material if it exceeds the greater of $25 million or 2 percent of an institutionís total assets at the time the FDIC was appointed receiver.
2 The FDICís supervision program promotes the safety and soundness of FDIC-supervised institutions, protects consumersí rights, and promotes community investment initiatives by FDIC-supervised insured depository institutions. The FDICís Division of Supervision and Consumer Protection (DSC) (1) performs examinations of FDIC-supervised institutions to assess their overall financial condition, management policies and practices (including internal control systems), and compliance with applicable laws and regulations, and (2) issues related guidance to institutions and examiners.








including implementation of the PCA provisions of section 38 of the FDI Act. Appendix 1 contains details on our objectives, scope, and methodology. Appendix 2 contains a glossary of key terms and Appendix 3 contains a list of acronyms. Appendix 4 contains the Corporationís comments on this report.

This report presents the FDIC OIGís analysis of Great Basinís failure and the FDICís efforts to ensure that its management operated the bank in a safe and sound manner. We are not making recommendations. Instead, as major causes, trends, and common characteristics of financial institution failures are identified in our reviews, we will communicate those to management for its consideration. As resources allow, we may also conduct more in-depth reviews of specific aspects of the FDICís supervision program and make recommendations, as warranted.

Background

Great Basin was a state-chartered nonmember bank, established by the NFID and insured by the FDIC effective July 29, 1993. Great Basin was a full-service community bank, and provided traditional banking services at a main office in Elko, Nevada and four branches in Elko, Winnemucca, Fallon, and Spring Creek, Nevada. The institutionís loan portfolio included, but was not limited to, out-of-territory purchased participation loans and a concentration in commercial real estate (CRE) loans. Great Basin also invested in securities including, but not limited to, Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) securities.

The bank was wholly owned by a one-bank holding company, Great Basin Financial Corporation, and had no other subsidiaries or affiliates. Great Basinís stock was not publicly traded. The bankís Board of Directors (Board) collectively owned or controlled approximately 24 percent of the outstanding shares of the holding company, and the bank president held a 10-percent interest as the principal shareholder of the parent company.

Table 1 summarizes Great Basinís financial condition as of December 2008, and for the 5 preceding calendar years.

Table 1: Financial Condition of Great Basin
Financial Measure Dec-08 Dec-07 Dec-06 Dec-05 Dec-04 Dec-03
Total Assets ($000s) $264,325 $253,612 $213,595 $184,911 $155,851 $133,068
Total Loans ($000s) $141,951 $146,248 $145,471 $118,050 $94,442 $81,206
Total Deposits ($000s) $241,262 $207,361 $196,688 $165,561 $130,254 $115,523
Net Income (Loss) ($000s) ($11,614) $2,122 $1,682 $1,391 $1,352 $1,304
Source: Uniform Bank Performance Reports (UBPR) and Reports of Examination (ROE)
for Great Basin.







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Causes of Failure and Material Loss

Great Basin failed because its Board did not ensure that bank management identified, measured, monitored, and controlled the risk associated with the institutionís lending activities. Specifically, Great Basinís Board and management failed to adequately assess the risk associated with expanding the loan portfolio through purchases of out-of-territory participation loans,3 particularly from 2006 through 2008. The bank also lacked effective risk management controls for its CRE loan portfolio. Additionally, poor risk management practices negatively impacted the bankís ability to effectively manage operations in a declining economic environment.

The weaknesses in Great Basinís loan portfolio were exacerbated by a downturn in the bankís market area and out-of-territory locations. Declining earnings, resulting from high provision expenses for deterioration in the loan portfolio, severely eroded the bankís capital. Additionally, losses associated with FNMA securities contributed to inadequate capital levels and reduced earnings. The NFID closed Great Basin due to the bankís Significantly Undercapitalized position.

Board of Directors and Bank Management Oversight of Operations

Great Basinís Board and management failed to identify, measure, monitor, and control the risks related to the bankís operations. In addition, the Board did not ensure that the bank complied with laws, regulations, and interagency policy and implemented recommendations made by the bankís auditors and FDIC and NFID examiners in a timely and effective manner.

Identifying, Measuring, Monitoring, and Controlling Risks

According to the DSC Risk Management Manual of Examination Policies (Examination Manual), the quality of management is probably the single most important element in the successful operation of a bank. The Examination Manual also states that it is extremely important for bank management to be aware of their responsibilities and to discharge those responsibilities in a manner that will ensure the stability and soundness of the institution. According to the manual, it is not necessary for the Board to be actively involved in day-to-day operations of the bank. However, the Board must provide clear guidance regarding acceptable risk exposure levels and ensure that appropriate policies, procedures, and practices have been established that translate the Boardís goals, objectives, and risk limits into prudent operating standards.

At the joint FDIC and NFID February 2008 and January 2009 examinations,4 examiners identified several areas in which Great Basinís Board and management had exhibited




3 A loan participation is a sharing or selling of ownership interests in a loan between two or more financial institutions.
4 Unless otherwise noted in this report, references to examination dates will refer to the month and year of the examination start dates.





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poor risk management practices that contributed to the unsatisfactory financial condition of the institution. Regarding risk management, the examinations concluded that the Board and management:

  • had been slow to recognize and address identified problem areas, including problem loans and associated losses;
  • had not maintained an adequately funded allowance for loan and lease losses (ALLL); and
  • needed to increase earnings and capital and improve liquidity management.

While examiners had previously noted the need for improvement in virtually all areas of bank operations, the joint FDIC and NFID January 2009 examination report concluded that (1) Great Basin managementís decision to enter in complex out-of-area participation loans was the key reason the bank was near failure and (2) management was critically deficient and that Board performance and oversight needed significant improvement.

Apparent Violations and Contraventions of Policy

According to the Examination Manual, it is important for the bankís Board to ensure that bank management is cognizant of applicable laws and regulations, develop a system to effect and monitor compliance, and, when violations do occur, make correction as quickly as possible. Examiners cited apparent violations and contraventions in four out of five examinations of Great Basin from February 2005 to January 2009, involving:

  • appraisals,
  • real estate lending,
  • asset quality,
  • loan underwriting and credit administration, and
  • other unsafe and unsound practices.

Further, citing the apparent violation of FDIC Rules and Regulations Part 337 Ė Unsafe and Unsound Banking Practices during the bankís January 2009 examination, examiners concluded that Great Basin was near failure due to bank managementís past decisions and actions or inactions.

Implementation of Auditor and Examiner Recommendations

Prior to Great Basinís failure, the bankís auditors and FDIC and NFID examiners expressed concerns about the institutionís risk management practices and made recommendations for improvement. However, the actions taken by Great Basinís Board and management were not timely or effective to adequately address those concerns. Our review of external auditor and examiner recommendations and FDIC examination reports for Great Basin indicated a well-documented pattern of recommendations made but lack of adequate attention by the bank to implement them. Specifically, Great Basinís external auditors, the FDIC, and NFID identified the need for the bank to improve loan underwriting and credit administration practices for participation loans and the CRE concentration. From December 2006 through September 2008, Great Basinís external auditors made recommendations to improve the approval and







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monitoring of purchased participations and CRE projects. The FDIC and NFID examiners also identified numerous credit administration and loan underwriting deficiencies as early as the July 2003 examination, and in subsequent examinations, including those conducted in February 2008 and January 2009.

Examiners concluded in the February 2008 and January 2009 examination reports that bank management had failed to take adequate and timely action to sufficiently address auditor and examiner concerns. Specifically, at the joint FDIC and NFID February 2008 examination, examiners determined that the bankís credit administration practices for purchased participation loans were especially poor, identifying significant deficiencies in the bankís monitoring and due diligence practices for these loans and making recommendations for improvement. However, at the January 2009 examination, examiners found that Great Basinís loan underwriting and credit administration practices were still in need of improvement, and bank managementís actions to address previously reported deficiencies were either not implemented in a timely manner or not effective.

Asset Growth Through Purchased Participation Loans Between 2006 and 2008

Great Basinís business strategy and lending activities involved purchased participation and CRE loans that, when combined, increased the size and risk of the bankís loan portfolio. According to the FDICís February 2008 examination report, Great Basinís Board and management purchased out-of-territory participation loans to diversify the bankís loan portfolio. The geographic markets where the purchased participation loans were originated experienced significant economic downturns and, in turn, considerably impacted Great Basinís asset quality and financial condition. As discussed earlier, Great Basinís Board and management failed to develop and implement adequate risk management controls to address the risk associated with the significant growth in those loans.

Figure 1 shows Great Basinís asset growth rates for December 2003 through March 2009, compared to the bankís peer group. As indicated, Great Basinís asset growth rate consistently and significantly exceeded the bankís peer group through December 2007.







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Figure 1: Great Basin's Asset Growth Rate Percentages Compared to Peers
Figure 1: Great Basin's Asset Growth Rate Percentages Compared to Peers
Source: UBPRs for Great Basin.

Great Basinís asset growth between 2003 and 2005 consisted of growth in virtually all loan categories. However, Great Basin purchases of participation loans, which started as early as 2001,5 significantly increased between 2006 and 2008, with Great Basin eventually purchasing approximately $33.2 million6 in participation loans, resulting in a significant increase in the bankís risk profile. Although the remaining balances for the purchased participation loans totaled only $25.6 million, or about 16 percent, of the bankís loan portfolio as of November 30, 2008 (as shown in Figure 2 in the Consideration of Risk Presented by Great Basinís Participation Loans section of this report), the loans presented significant risk to Great Basin, which the bankís Board and management failed to adequately assess and control.

Managing Risk Associated with Purchased Participation Loans

Great Basinís decision to purchase participation loans without implementing adequate risk management controls, including the assessment of third-party risk, significantly increased the bankís risk profile and exposure to losses. The participation loans consisted of out-of-territory CRE and unsecured loans, with the greatest number of the purchased




5 Information on the amount of participations that Great Basin purchased in 2001 was not available in the FDICís examination records.
6 Data regarding the original balances of Great Basinís purchased participation loans totaling $33.2 million as of March 31, 2009, is based on bank records provided to the OIG by the FDIC Division of Resolutions and Receiverships.





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participation loans in CRE. Some of the complex, high-risk participation loans included mezzanine7 financing in which Great Basin held junior lien positions and interest rates well above average prime rates.8 The risk presented by the purchased participation loans, totaling $25.6 million as of November 30, 2008, became apparent at the January 2009 examination, when it was determined that the participation loans represented 45 percent of the bankís adversely classified loans, of which 22 percent were CRE purchased participation loans, and 85 percent of the loans classified as ďLossĒ.

An institutionís Board and senior management are ultimately responsible for managing activities conducted through third-party relationships, and identifying and controlling the risks arising from such relationships, to the same extent as if the activity were handled within the institution. A third-party relationship should be considered significant for various reasons including, but not limited to, whether the (1) relationship has a material effect on the institutionís revenues or expenses; (2) third-party performs critical functions; or (3) third-party poses risks that could significantly affect earnings or capital.

Great Basinís purchase of participation loans from third-party brokers materially affected the bankís revenue, earnings, and capital, and the brokers performed critical functions related to loan underwriting and credit administration. Great Basin purchased participation loans from several entities, including finance companies, investment banks, and FDIC-insured nonmember and national banks. The borrowers and the properties that served as collateral for the loans were located in various parts of the country, including Georgia, Nevada, California, Florida, Louisiana, Kentucky, and Minnesota.

Examiners sometimes find that a participation loan does not meet the financial institutionís established underwriting standards, too often with predictable results. Institutions often ďbuyĒ the types of loans they cannot originate in their normal trade area; however, those institutions may lack lenders with sufficient expertise to analyze the participation loan.

Institutions entering into participation arrangements can avoid common pitfalls and mitigate third-party risks by, among other things,
  • Conducting a thorough risk assessment to ensure that the proposed relationship is consistent with the institutionís strategic plan and overall business strategy;
  • Conducting thorough due diligence to focus on the third partyís financial condition, relevant experience, reputation, and the scope and effectiveness of its operations and controls;
  • Reviewing applicable accounting guidance to determine if the participation agreement meets the criteria for a loan sale or a secured borrowing. Key issues to consider include rights to repurchase and recourse arrangements; and
  • Developing a comprehensive monitoring program.
Source: Supervisory Insights, Summer 2007.

Great Basinís Board and management did not implement adequate risk management controls, including conducting due diligence, performing independent credit analyses, or considering the borrowerís ability to repay and the sufficiency of the underlying collateral. Also, Great Basinís loan policy did not sufficiently address purchased participation loans and the risk associated with the third-party relationships. Further, some of the purchased participation loans had questionable collateral values from the beginning, and some loan


7 Mezzanine financing is extension of credit on a subordinated basis that is neither equity nor senior debt.
8 Prime Rate is the base rate on corporate loans posted by at least 75 percent of the nationís 30 largest banks.


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projects had problems early on that potentially impacted the feasibility of the entire project. As discussed previously, the February 2008 examination concluded that credit administration practices for purchased participation loans needed significant improvement; however, bank management continued to increase the purchased participation loan portfolio after the joint FDIC and NFID February 2008 examination. Finally, examiners determined at the January 2009 examination that loan administration practices were critically deficient for purchased participation loans, indicating that bank management had failed to adequately and timely address examiner concerns.

CRE Loan Concentration

Great Basinís total CRE loans ranged from about 218 percent of Tier 1 Capital at the February 2008 examination to 457 percent at the October 2006 examination. In addition, as shown in Table 2, Great Basinís CRE portfolio, as a percent of total loans, significantly exceeded the bankís peer group9 averages from December 2003 through December 2008.

Table 2: Great Basinís Percentage of CRE Loans to Total Loans Compared to Peers from December 2003 to December 2008
Period
Ended
CRE/Total Loans
Great Basin Peer Group
  Percentages include owner-occupied CRE
Dec-03 44.46 24.54
Dec-04 41.18 26.05
Dec-05 44.88 30.17
Dec-06 46.93 31.02
Dec-07 44.37 31.89
Dec-08 47.72 31.34
Source: UBPRs for Great Basin.

According to Financial Institution Letter (FIL)104-2006, entitled, Concentrations in Commercial Real Estate, Sound Risk Management Practices, dated December 12, 2006, concentrations can pose substantial potential risks and can inflict large losses on institutions. Although the guidance does not specifically limit a bankís CRE lending, it provides supervisory criteria for identifying financial institutions that may have potentially significant concentration in CRE loans, warranting greater supervisory scrutiny. Specifically, FIL-104-2006 provides guidance as to when greater supervisory scrutiny may be appropriate for financial institutions and describes a risk management framework that institutions should implement to effectively identify, measure, monitor, and control CRE concentration risk. That




9 Commercial banks are assigned to one of 25 peer groups based on asset size, number of branches, and whether the bank is located in a metropolitan or non-metropolitan area. Great Basinís peer group was that of all insured commercial banks with assets between $100 million and $300 million in a non-metropolitan area with three or more full service offices.





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framework includes effective oversight by bank management, including the Board and senior executives, portfolio stress testing and sensitivity analysis, sound loan underwriting and administration, and portfolio management practices.

At the January 2009 examination, when owner-occupied CRE is excluded, Great Basinís CRE loans represented about 579 percent of Total Capital, exceeding the 300 percent parameter established in the 2006 guidance warranting greater supervisory scrutiny. The increase in the CRE loans to Total Capital at the January 2009 examination was due, in part, to the significant decrease in the bankís capital position.

Inadequate Risk Management Practices for CRE Loans

Great Basin failed to establish and implement adequate controls to effectively address the bankís CRE loans. Examiners reported deficiencies in Great Basinís risk management practices for the CRE loans as early as July 2003. Recommendations related to the bankís inadequate CRE risk management practices were also noted in the examinations conducted in February 2005 through February 2008. Those recommendations were related, but not limited to, the following issues:

  • defining and tracking speculative lending at a level commensurate with CRE lending activities,
  • establishing adequate procedures to stress test individual projects and the total CRE portfolio,
  • establishing guidelines for contingency planning to reduce concentrations in excess of policy limits and to adjust CRE limits during changing markets,
  • including the December 12, 2006 CRE guidance in the bankís concentration policy,
  • measuring all concentrations relative to Tier 1 Capital, and
  • improving controls related to the use of interest reserves.

Although examiners for the January 2009 examination report concluded that Great Basin had made some improvements relative to CRE monitoring, numerous repeat deficiencies and recommendations were identified, and additional enhancements for concentration monitoring and reporting were necessary.

Adversely Classified Assets and Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses

As management began to recognize the deterioration in the bankís loan portfolio and as adverse classifications increased, additional provisions to the ALLL were required. Asset quality deteriorated to less than satisfactory with a rating10 of ď3Ē at the joint February 2008




10 Financial institution regulators and examiners use the Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System (UFIRS) to evaluate a bankís performance in six components represented by the CAMELS acronym: Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management practices, Earnings performance, Liquidity position, and Sensitivity to market risk. Each component, and an overall composite score, is assigned a rating of 1 through 5, with 1 having the least regulatory concern and 5 having the greatest concern.





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examination. Adversely classified items as a percent of Tier 1 Capital plus ALLL totaled 30.08 percent. Further, during the February 2008 examination, purchased participation loans represented 99 percent of the $5.9 million of adversely classified items. Examiners concluded that a provision expense of $650,000 to $700,000 was needed to replenish the ALLL after adjusting for the loss classification identified at the February 2008 examination. Additionally, weaknesses identified in credit administration and monitoring of the participation loans at this examination adversely affected the bankís compliance with ALLL requirements. Bank management agreed to implement the ALLL methodology recommendations and made additional provisions to the ALLL.

Table 3: Great Basinís Adversely Classified Items and ALLL
Asset Quality
(Dollars in Thousands)
Examination Date Total Adversely Classified Items Adversely Classified Items as a Percent of Tier 1 Capital plus ALLL ALLL Computed by Great Basin Increase in ALLL Computed by Examiners
July 2003 $4,281 44.26% $1,360 0
February 2005 $1,090 8.48% $1,208 0
October 2006 $2,312 14.59% $1,565 0
February 2008 $5,950 30.08% $2,151 $700
January 2009 $24,519 199.47% $6,620 $5,000
Source: ROEs and UBPRs for Great Basin.

Purchased participations and CRE loans made up a significant portion of the total adversely classified loans at the January 2009 examinationópurchased participations, including purchased CRE participation loans, represented 45 percent of total classified loans11 and CRE loans represented 37 percent.12 In addition, purchased participations represented 85 percent of the loans classified as ďLossĒ at the January 2009 examination.

Investments in FNMA Securities

Great Basin experienced losses associated with its FNMA securities in 2008 that contributed to the bankís depleted capital and reduced the bankís earnings. In 2008, the FDIC initiated a




11 Includes CRE-purchased participations and other types of purchased participation loans.
12 Includes non-purchased participation CRE loans.





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process to determine the extent to which FDIC-supervised banks were potentially exposed to FNMA and/or Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation preferred or common stock. On September 24, 2008, Great Basin management informed the FDIC that the bank needed to write-down its FNMA preferred stock by over $2 million at the end of September 2008, and that this would likely result in a reclassification of the bankís PCA category to Adequately Capitalized. In fact, the bankís $5.2 million in net losses as of September 30, 2008, which took into account the bankís losses in FNMA preferred stock, lowered the bankís capital category to Undercapitalized. On December 31, 2008, Great Basin reported $2.1 million in losses in FNMA preferred stock and $739,000 losses in mutual funds.

The FDICís Supervision of Great Basin

The FDIC and NFID provided ongoing supervision of Great Basin and performed six onsite examinations from June 2002 to January 2009. The FDIC also performed offsite monitoring in 2008 that resulted in a downgrade to the institutionís ratings. The joint examinations included concerns and recommendations regarding weak risk management practices related to purchased participation loans and CRE loans, and loan underwriting and credit administration deficiencies. Examiners also reported apparent violations of law and contraventions of policy associated with the institutionís lending practices. During the February 2008 examination, the FDIC and NFID recognized the significance of the bankís increased risk profile due to the increase in purchased participation loans and made several recommendations to improve the bankís monitoring and due diligence practices. Beginning in July 2003, and as the institutionís condition deteriorated in February 2008 and January 2009, the FDIC and NFID took enforcement actions to address identified deficiencies.

Supervisory History

The FDIC and NFID performed joint examinations of Great Basin in June 2002, July 2003, October 2006, February 2008, and January 2009. The FDIC performed an independent on-site examination of Great Basin in February 2005 and off-site monitoring in December 2008. Table 4 summarizes key information pertaining to examinations ending with the Cease and Desist Order (C&D) issued as a result of the January 2009 examination.







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Table 4: Examination History of Great Basin From June 2002 to January 2009
Examination Start Date Examination as of Date Agency Supervisory Ratings (UFIRS) Supervisory/Enforcement Action
06/17/2002 3/31/2002 FDIC and NFID 332322/3 Bank Board Resolution (BBR) (adopted July 18, 2002)
07/21/2003 03/31/2003 FDIC and NFID 232222/2 BBR
02/28/2005 12/31/2004 FDIC 222222/2 BBR terminated
10/02/2006 06/30/2006 FDIC and NFID 222222/2 None
02/25/2008 12/31/2007 FDIC and NFID 333222/3 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) (effective July 31, 2008)
12/9/2008* 09/30/2008 FDIC 544433/4 Continuation of MOU (effective July 31, 2008)
01/12/2009 12/31/2008 FDIC and NFID 555544/5 C&D (effective April 15, 2009)
Source: ROEs for Great Basin
* The FDIC conducted offsite monitoring during December 2008, determined that the bankís financial condition had substantially deteriorated, and downgraded the bankís CAMELS ratings.

A BBR, issued July 18, 2002, sought to address examiner concerns associated with asset quality during the June 2002 joint examination of the bank. In July 2003, Great Basin received a composite ď2Ē rating, indicating that the institutionís overall condition was satisfactory. However, asset quality remained a significant regulatory concern at the July 2003 examination, resulting in a component rating of ď3Ē. The July 2003 ROE reported that additional attention to improve asset quality and achieve sustainable earnings was warranted. Great Basin received composite ď2Ē ratings in February 2005 and October 2006, and, at the February 2005 examination, examiners concluded that bank management had substantially satisfied the BBR provisions and terminated the action.

The February 2008 joint examination revealed that the overall condition of the institution was less than satisfactory due to asset quality deterioration combined with credit administration weaknesses, specifically in monitoring purchased participation loans and the bankís CRE concentration. The FDIC and NFID entered into an MOU based on the results of the examination which required Great Basin to:

  • reduce the bankís risk exposure in adversely classified and special mention loans;
  • improve the internal loan review program;
  • improve information regarding the overall quality of the bankís loan portfolio, including participation loans;
  • improve credit underwriting and administration activities;
  • develop a plan to reduce loan concentration risk;
  • improve the methodology for determining the adequacy of the ALLL; and
  • implement a strategic plan that included a capital plan for improving capital levels.

On December 16, 2008, the FDIC completed an offsite review of the institutionís September 30, 2008 Report of Condition and Income (Call Report) data, and noted that the bankís







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financial condition had deteriorated significantly as a result of asset quality problems centered in CRE loans and securities since the February 2008 examination. As a result, the FDIC issued an interim rating change on December 16, 2008 and downgraded the bankís ratings from 333222/3 to 544433/4.

Further, given the change in Great Basinís capital category to Undercapitalized as of September 30, 2008, the next examination, which was originally scheduled for February 2009, was accelerated to January 2009. This examination determined that Great Basinís overall financial condition was unsatisfactory and its future viability threatened unless the bank addressed its poor risk management practices immediately and improved its capital position.

As a result of the January 2009 examination, the FDIC and NFID proposed a C&D due to significant weaknesses involving Board oversight and management supervision, asset quality, earnings, and liquidity and the bankís failure to implement prior recommendations. Great Basin stipulated to the C&D on April 9, 2009 and the FDIC issued the order effective April 15, 2009. The C&D required Great Basin to, among other things:

  • obtain and retain qualified management; and
  • submit written plans to
    • increase Board participation,
    • increase Tier 1 Capital by no less than 12 percent and maintain it at 9 percent or above,
    • eliminate all assets classified as Loss and one-half of assets classified as Doubtful,
    • reduce the institutionís CRE loan concentration, and
    • eliminate and/or correct all violations of law.

On April 17, 2009, the NFID closed Great Basin due to its severely deteriorated financial condition and the bankís inability to raise additional capital, and named the FDIC as receiver.

Consideration of Risk Presented by Great Basinís Purchased Participation Loans

Great Basinís growth in purchased participation loans resulted in elevated supervisory concern during the February 2008 examination with the FDIC making numerous recommendations to the Board and management to address deficiencies in Great Basinís credit administration practices for those loans. Similar concerns and recommendations were also noted at the January 2009 examination.

As discussed previously, Great Basin had purchased participation loans since at least 2001. Figure 2 illustrates the cumulative amount of the balances for Great Basinís purchased







13






participation loans based on the year that Great Basin purchased the loans, as of November 30, 2008.13

Figure 2: Great Basinís Purchased Participation Loan Balances as of November 30, 2008
Figure 2: Great Basinís Purchased Participation Loan Balances as of November 30, 2008
Source: FDIC January 2009 examination work papers for Great Basin.

Examiners are responsible for evaluating and reporting the extent to which institutions assess and mitigate third-party risk, such as the risk involved in relying on another institution to properly underwrite and administer a loan in which an institution has a participation interest. Specifically, the Examination Manual states that institutions that purchase participation loans (1) must make a thorough, independent evaluation of the transaction and the risks involved before committing any funds and (2) should apply the same standards of prudence, credit assessment, approval criteria, and ďin-houseĒ limits that would be employed if the purchasing organization were originating the loan.

The FDICís review of purchased participations during examinations conducted before February 2008 was limited, due to the fact that those loans represented a small segment of the bankís loan portfolio when those examinations were conducted. During the pre-examination planning for the February 2008 examination, Great Basinís president informed the FDIC that the purchased participation loans were the weakest segment of the bankís loan portfolio, and the bankís external auditor informed the FDIC of concerns related to the bankís monitoring and oversight of the purchased participation loans and the bankís ALLL methodology for those credits. Consistent with that input, the examination report reflected that examiners conducted a detailed review of purchased participations, including all of the purchased participation loans on the bankís watch list that exceeded $250,000 and a sample of the purchased loans based on the broker involved in the transaction. That




13 Figure 2 does not include purchased participation loans for years 2002 through 2008 that may have been sold, charged off, or paid off; this information was not available in the FDICís examination records.





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review determined that the bankís risk management, monitoring, and due diligence practices were not adequate. However, by the time the FDIC identified and reported the significant risk and control deficiencies associated with the purchased participation loans, Great Basinís exposure to substantial losses had measurably increased.

The February 2008 examination concluded that Great Basinís:

  • Management had not performed proper due diligence on the purchased participation loans.
  • Management and Board failed to identify and properly assess the loan participation markets they entered and had not implemented sound lending controls.
  • Lending staff did not have the expertise to make informed credit decisions on these complex, high-risk participation loans.

After the February 2008 examination, the FDIC conducted offsite monitoring of Great Basin in December 2008 and determined that the bankís condition had deteriorated significantly as a result of asset quality problems centered in CRE loans and securities. Loan administration and credit and market monitoring were inadequate, and management had been slow to recognize and address problem areas, including those for purchased participations. In addition, deficiencies were noted in bank managementís selection of risk and lending practices. Further, examiners determined that, as of September 30, 2008, nonaccrual loans had become significant, provisions of $4.6 million were required to fund the ALLL, and the bankís return on assets was negative 2.65 percent. As a result of these findings and other operational deficiencies, the FDIC downgraded Great Basinís composite and all of the component ratings.

Similar to the previous examination, the January 2009 examination also made recommendations associated with purchased participations, requesting bank management to develop (1) adequate lending policies for the complex construction and insurance company participation lending and (2) participation loan standards for pre-purchase due diligence and ongoing monitoring. However, Great Basin had already purchased more than $33.2 million in participation loans and had approximately $26 million still in the bankís loan portfolio, rendering these recommendations ineffective in mitigating the risk associated with its lending activities.

Supervisory Response to Great Basinís CRE Loan Concentration

Examination coverage and results associated with the bankís CRE loans for Great Basin follows.

  • July 2003 Examination. The examination report noted a CRE concentration of 369 percent of Tier 1 Capital as of June 30, 2003, with no material credit underwriting weaknesses and mitigation of risk






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    achieved through the bankís diversification practices. Examiners made recommendations related to the bankís monitoring and reporting of the CRE concentration.

  • February 2005 Examination. Examiners concluded that overall underwriting and credit administration were satisfactory, but also included recommendations to improve the bankís loan-to-value limits and concentration calculations. In addition, examiners did not include a concentrations page or specifically report on the bankís CRE concentration in the February 2005 examination report because they concluded that Great Basin did not have a concentration that exceeded 100 percent of Tier 1 Capital. Further, the Summary Analysis of Examination Report for the February 2005 examination indicated that the bank did not have any concentrations. In actuality, according to Great Basinís UBPR as of December 31, 2004óthe as of date for the February 2005 examinationóthe bank had a concentration in CRE of 302.55 percent of Total Capital, compared to the bankís peer group of 151.36 percent of Total Capital.
  • October 2006 Examination. The examination report concluded that the bankís CRE concentration had increased to approximately 457 percent of Tier 1 Capital as of June 30, 2006, and 70 percent of the CRE was owner-occupied.
  • February 2008 Examination. The joint FDIC and NFID February 2008 examination concluded that the bankís total funded CRE concentration represented 324 percent of Tier 1 Capital as of December 31, 2007. Examiners made several recommendations to improve asset quality, loan underwriting, and credit administration, including the use of interest reserves, associated with CRE loans.

Despite the repeated recommendations, the final examination report prior to Great Basinís failure in 2009 noted that significant improvement was needed in the Boardís and managementís oversight of the CRE concentration.

Sufficiency and Timeliness of Supervisory Actions

The FDIC and NFID issued an MOU as a result of the February 2008 examination and a C&D as a result of the January 2009 examination.

  • Memorandum of Understanding. In July 2008, the FDIC issued the MOU as a result of the February 2008 examination. Although the MOU addressed the major deficiencies noted during the February 2008 examination regarding purchased participation loans and CRE concentration monitoring, the MOU did not contain a provision for qualified management, a significant factor in the poor oversight of the purchased participation loan portfolio.
  • Cease and Desist Order. The FDIC and NFID issued a joint C&D effective April 15, 2009, 2 days before the bank was closed by NFID. According to FDIC regional office officials, various actions had to be resolved before the C&D could be issued. Those actions included (1) completing the January 2009






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    examination, which did not occur until March 9, 2009; (2) the need for the FDIC to discuss the C&D provisions with Great Basinís president and the bankís attorneys; and (3) the Boardís agreement to stipulate to the C&D. Accordingly, the C&D was not ready for issuance until April 15, 2009.

The FDICís supervisory and enforcement actions issued in July 2008 and April 2009 addressed most of the deficiencies at the bank. However, the action taken in July 2008 did not require Great Basin to obtain qualified management, a significant factor in the poor oversight of the purchased participation loan portfolio. Further, significant deterioration in Great Basinís asset quality had occurred before these actions were taken, and the effects of poor risk management practices, purchased participation loans, and the CRE concentration had significantly impacted the institutionís financial condition, in general, and loan portfolio, in particular. Further, although the FDIC and NFID took action after the February 2008 examination to address the bankís deficiencies, bank management continued to purchase participation loans, increasing both the bankís risk profile and the probability, and ultimate realization, of significant losses to the institution.

Implementation of PCA

The purpose of PCA is to resolve problems of insured depository institutions at the least possible long-term cost to the DIF. PCA establishes a system of restrictions and mandatory and discretionary supervisory actions that are to be triggered depending on an institutionís capital levels. Part 325 of the FDICís Rules and Regulations implements PCA requirements by establishing a framework for taking prompt corrective action against insured nonmember banks that are not adequately capitalized. Table 5 provides Great Basinís capital ratios as of September 30, 2008 and December 31, 2008.

Table 5: Great Basinís Capital Ratios
Capital Category Capital Ratios
September 30, 2008 December 31, 2008
Tier 1 Leverage Capital 4.32% 2.04%
Tier 1 Risk-Based Capital 6.25% 3.16%
Total Risk-Based Capital 7.52% 4.45%
Source: ROEs and UBPRs for Great Basin

We concluded that the FDIC properly implemented applicable PCA provisions of section 38 based on the supervisory actions taken for Great Basin. On December 2, 2008, the FDIC informed Great Basin that based on the September 30, 2008 Call Report data the bank was considered to be Undercapitalized as shown above for PCA purposes. Three months later, given the December 31, 2008 Call Report data, as stated above, the bank was categorized as Significantly Undercapitalized for PCA purposes. Accordingly, Great Basin became subject to the mandatory requirements of section 38, including submission of a capital restoration plan and restrictions on asset growth, acquisitions, new activities, and new branches. Further restrictions applied to the payment of dividends or management fees, or making any other







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capital distributions. Although Great Basin was not using brokered deposits, the bankís Undercapitalized position prohibited the bank from accepting, renewing, or rolling over any brokered deposits unless it obtained a waiver from the FDIC.

Great Basinís attempts to sell the bank and/or substantially increase capital were unsuccessful. In October 2008, the bank unsuccessfully contracted with an investment banker to market the sale of the bank as a strategy to resolve its capital needs. In March 2009, Great Basin increased its capital by approximately $1.1 million and increased its Tier 1 Leverage Ratio to 2.7 percent. However, the bankís problem assets and substantial negative earnings ($11.6 million) further impacted the bankís ability to raise capital.

On March 18, 2009, FDIC informed Great Basin that the capital plan submitted on December 23, 2008 was unacceptable, and needed to be revised due to unrealistic projections for capital levels, income, and assets. Great Basin and Great Basin Financial Corporation, the holding company for the bank, submitted a Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) application in December 2008. The FDIC returned the TARP application on March 18, 2009 stating that the viability of the bank was highly unlikely. Additionally, the FDIC stated in the March 18, 2009 letter to Great Basin that an acceptable capital plan for a ďtroubled institutionĒ should not be reliant on the TARP Capital Purchase Program.

Corporation Comments

After we issued our draft report, we met with management officials to further discuss our results. Management provided additional information for our consideration, and we revised our report to reflect this information, as appropriate. On December 2, 2009, the Director, DSC, provided a written response to the draft report. That response is provided in its entirety as Appendix 4 of this report.

DSC reiterated the OIGís conclusions regarding the causes of Great Basinís failure. DSC also stated that Great Basinís Board and management were expected to identify and control the third-party risks arising from the relationships for its purchased participation loan portfolio. With regard to the FDICís supervision of Great Basin, DSC stated that examiners identified the risks associated with the purchased participations in 2008 as weaknesses in the bankís loan underwriting and credit administration became apparent. DSC further stated that the FDIC has issued guidance which outlines the basic elements for effective third-party risk management and for the performance of due diligence on purchased loan participations.







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Appendix 1

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Objectives

We performed this audit in accordance with section 38(k) of the FDI Act, which provides that if a deposit insurance fund incurs a material loss with respect to an insured depository institution, the Inspector General of the appropriate federal banking agency shall prepare a report to that agency reviewing the agencyís supervision of the institution. The FDI Act requires that the report be completed within 6 months after it becomes apparent that a material loss has been incurred.

Our audit objectives were to (1) determine the causes of the financial institutionís failure and resulting material loss to the DIF and (2) evaluate the FDICís supervision of the institution, including implementation of the PCA provisions of section 38.

We conducted this performance audit from June 2009 to December 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Scope and Methodology

The scope of this audit included an analysis of Great Basinís operations from July 2003 until its failure in April 2009. Our review also entailed an evaluation of the regulatory supervision of the institution from July 2003 to January 2009.

To achieve the objectives, we performed the following procedures and techniques:

  • Analyzed examination reports prepared jointly by the FDIC and NFID for the July 2003, October 2006, February 2008, and January 2009 examinations and the FDIC February 2005 examination.
  • Reviewed the following:
    • Work papers of the February 2008 and January 2009 examinations.
    • Documentation for offsite monitoring activities performed by the FDIC.
    • Bank data and correspondence maintained at DSCís San Francisco Regional Office and Phoenix Field Office.
    • Reports prepared by the Division of Resolutions and Receiverships (DRR) and DSC relating to the bankís closure.



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Appendix 1

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

    • Audit reports of the bankís external auditor, McGladrey & Pullen, LLP, Las Vegas, Nevada.
    • Work papers of the bankís external auditor for loan review, BankVision, Inc., Milpitas, California.
    • Pertinent DSC policies and procedures.
  • Interviewed the following FDIC officials:
    • DSC management in Washington, D.C. and San Francisco, California and FDIC examiners from the Phoenix and Los Angeles Field Offices who participated in Great Basin examinations.
  • Met with officials from the NFID of Carson City, Nevada to discuss their historical perspective of the institution, its examinations, state banking laws, and other activities regarding the NFIDís supervision of the bank.

    We performed the audit field work at the DSC office in Phoenix, Arizona.

    Internal Control, Reliance on Computer-processed Information, Performance Measurement, and Compliance with Laws and Regulations

    Consistent with the audit objectives, we did not assess DSCís overall internal control or management control structure. We relied on information in DSC systems, reports, ROEs, and interviews of examiners to understand Great Basin management controls pertaining to causes of failure and material loss as discussed in the body of this report.

    We obtained data from various systems but determined that information system controls were not significant to the audit objectives, and therefore, did not evaluate the effectiveness of information system controls. We relied on our analysis of information from various sources, including ROEs, correspondence files, and testimonial evidence to corroborate data obtained from systems that were used to support our audit conclusions.

    The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (the Results Act) directs Executive Branch agencies to develop a customer-focused strategic plan, align agency programs and activities with concrete missions and goals, and prepare and report on annual performance plans. For this material loss review, we did not assess the strengths and weaknesses of DSCís annual performance plan in meeting the requirements of the Results Act because such an assessment is not relevant to the audit objectives. DSCís compliance with the Results Act is reviewed in program audits of DSC operations.







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    Appendix 1

    Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

    Regarding compliance with laws and regulations, we performed tests to determine whether the FDIC had complied with provisions of PCA and limited tests to determine compliance with certain aspects of the FDI Act. The results of our tests were discussed, where appropriate, in the report. Additionally, we assessed the risk of fraud and abuse related to our objectives in the course of evaluating audit evidence.













































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    Appendix 2

    Glossary of Terms

    Term Definition
    Adversely Classified Assets Assets subject to criticism and/or comment in an examination report. Adversely classified assets are allocated on the basis of risk (lowest to highest) into three categories: Substandard, Doubtful, and Loss.
    Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses (ALLL) Federally insured depository institutions must maintain an ALLL that is adequate to absorb the estimated loan losses associated with the loan and lease portfolio (including all binding commitments to lend). To the extent not provided for in a separate liability account, the ALLL should also be sufficient to absorb estimated loan losses associated with off-balance sheet loan instruments such as standby letters of credit.
    Bank Board Resolution (BBR) BBRs are informal commitments adopted by a financial institutionís Board (often at the request of the FDIC) directing the institutionís personnel to take corrective action regarding specific noted deficiencies. BBRs may also be used as a tool to strengthen and monitor the institutionís progress with regard to a particular component rating or activity. The FDIC is not a party to these resolutions, but may review or draft the documents as a means of initiating corrective action.
    Call Report Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (also known as the Call Report) are reports that are required to be filed by every national bank, state member bank, and insured nonmember bank pursuant to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. These reports are used to calculate deposit insurance assessments and monitor the condition, performance, and risk profile of individual banks and the banking industry.
    Cease and Desist Order (C&D) A C&D is a formal enforcement action issued by a financial institution regulator to a bank or affiliated party to stop an unsafe or unsound practice or a violation of laws and regulations. A C&D may be terminated when the bankís condition has significantly improved and the action is no longer needed or the bank has materially complied with its terms.
    Concentration A concentration is a significantly large volume of economically related assets that an institution has advanced or committed to a certain industry, person, entity, or affiliated group. These assets may, in the aggregate, present a substantial risk to the safety and soundness of the institution.
    Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) FNMA is a congressional chartered corporation which buys mortgages on the secondary market, pools them and sells them as mortgage-backed securities to investors on the open market. Monthly principal and interest payments are guaranteed by FNMA but not by the U.S. Government.
    Loan-to-Value Loan-to-value is the percentage or ratio that is derived at the time of loan origination by dividing an extension of credit by the total value of the property securing or being improved by the extension of credit plus the amount of any readily marketable collateral and other acceptable collateral that secures the extension of credit.



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    Appendix 2

    Glossary of Terms

    Term Definition
    Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) The purpose of PCA is to resolve the problems of insured depository institutions at the least possible long-term cost to the DIF. Part 325 of the FDIC Rules and Regulations, 12 Code of Federal Regulations, section 325.101, et. seq., implements section 38, Prompt Corrective Action, of the FDI Act, 12 United States Code section 1831o, by establishing a framework for taking prompt supervisory actions against insured nonmember banks that are less than adequately capitalized. The following terms are used to describe capital adequacy: (1) Well Capitalized, (2) Adequately Capitalized, (3) Undercapitalized, (4) Significantly Undercapitalized, and (5) Critically Undercapitalized.

    A PCA Directive is a formal enforcement action seeking corrective action or compliance with the PCA statute with respect to an institution that falls within any of the three categories of undercapitalized institutions.
    Special Mention Loans Special Mention loans have potential weaknesses that deserve managementís close attention. If left uncorrected, these potential weaknesses may result in deterioration of the repayment prospects for the asset or in the institution's credit position at some future date. Special Mention loans are not adversely classified and do not expose an institution to sufficient risk to warrant adverse classification.
    Uniform Bank Performance Report (UBPR) The UBPR is an individual analysis of financial institution financial data and ratios that includes extensive comparisons to peer group performance. The report is produced by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council for the use of banking supervisors, bankers, and the general public and is produced quarterly from data reported in Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income submitted by banks.





















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    Appendix 3

    Acronyms


    ALLL Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses
    BBR Bank Board Resolution
    C&D Cease and Desist Order
    CAMELS Capital, Asset Quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to Market Risk
    CRE Commercial Real Estate
    DIF Deposit Insurance Fund
    DRR Division of Resolutions and Receiverships
    DSC Division of Supervision and Consumer Protection
    FDI Federal Deposit Insurance
    FIL Financial Institution Letter
    FNMA Federal National Mortgage Association
    MOU Memorandum of Understanding
    NFID Nevada Financial Institutions Division
    OIG Office of Inspector General
    PCA Prompt Corrective Action
    ROE Report of Examination
    TARP Troubled Asset Relief Program
    UBPR Uniform Bank Performance Report
    UFIRS Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System











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    Appendix 4

    Corporation Comments

    November 30, 2009
    MEMORANDUM TO:Stephen Beard
    Assistant Inspector General for Material Loss Reviews
     
    FROM:Sandra L. Thompson [Electronically produced version; original signed by Sandra L. Thompson]
    Director
     
    SUBJECT:Draft Audit Report Entitled, Material Loss Review of Great Basin Bank of Nevada, Elko, Nevada
    (Assignment No. 2009-046)
     

    Pursuant to Section 38(k) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDI Act), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporationís Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted a material loss review of Great Basin Bank of Nevada (Great Basin) which failed on April 17, 2009. This memorandum is the response of the Division of Supervision and Consumer Protection (DSC) to the OIGís Draft Report (Report) received on November 5, 2009.

    The Report concludes that Great Basinís failure was due to the Board and senior managementís ineffective risk management practices associated with overseeing lending activities. Great Basinís lending controls did not adequately assess the third-party risk of out-of-territory purchased loan participations, which resulted in significant loan losses. Declining earnings due to high loan loss provisions from a deteriorating loan portfolio and losses from Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) preferred stock contributed to inadequate capital levels and reduced earnings.

    The FDIC and the Nevada State Banking Department provided on-going supervision performing five on-site examinations and off-site monitoring between 2003 and 2009, resulting in a downgrade of Great Basinís ratings in 2008. Joint on-site examinations noted regulatory concerns and made recommendations to correct ineffective risk management practices, commercial real estate concentrations, and loan underwriting and credit administration deficiencies.

    Great Basin significantly increased their investment in purchased loan participations between the 2006 and 2008 examination. FDIC examiners identified the risks associated with these purchased loan participations in 2008 as weaknesses in loan underwriting and credit administration became apparent. By 2008, 16 percent of Great Basinís loan portfolio consisted of purchased loan participations. Ultimately the purchased participation portion of the loan portfolio accounted for 85 percent of Great Basinís losses indicated the poor risk selection of these loans.

    Great Basinís Board and management were expected to identify and control the third-party risks arising from such relationships to the same extent as if the activity, such as lending, were handled within the institution. FDIC issued a Financial Institution Letter on Managing Third Party Risks in June of 2008, which outlined the basic elements for effective third party risk











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    Appendix 4

    Corporation Comments



    management. Moreover, FDICís Summer 2007 Supervisory Insights Journal provided risk management procedures for performing due diligence specifically on purchased loan participations.

    Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the Report.





































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    Last updated 1/13/2009