The past semiannual reporting period has been marked by significant organizational change in the Office of Inspector General (OIG). Three members of our senior management team retired, and several reorganizations, planned office closings, and changes in leadership responsibilities have been announced. Other OIG staff retired or left to pursue different opportunities, and through a buyout program offered by the OIG, six additional members of the OIG will be leaving our office at the end of the calendar year. Thus, our staff has been adjusting to a significantly different working environment, and I am proud of their continued focus on the OIG mission and impressive results during this time of flux.

To illustrate, during the reporting period, we achieved great success with a significant case involving a failed institution—BestBank. A Denver jury returned guilty verdicts on 63 counts—bank fraud, operating a continuing financial crimes enterprise, making false bank reports, and wire fraud—against two people involved in a complex financial institution and consumer fraud that led to the 1998 failure of BestBank and concomitant $200 million loss to the Bank Insurance Fund. We have been working with the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Internal Revenue Service on the case since that time. Given the losses to the fund, consumers, and uninsured depositors, as well as the message the convictions send about the government’s refusal to tolerate such criminal activity, it was a worthy investment.

On the audit side, we conducted extensive work and issued three products to satisfy our Federal Information Security Management Act reporting responsibilities. We reported that the FDIC has made significant progress in improving its information security controls and practices and additional improvements were underway at the time of our evaluation. We identified no significant deficiencies as defined by the Office of Management and Budget that warranted consideration as a potential material weakness. We identified seven steps that the Corporation can take to enhance its information security program and practices, and we continue to coordinate closely with FDIC management on corporate information security efforts.

From an overall OIG perspective, and as summarized in the Organization section of this semiannual report, we completed our Fiscal Year 2005 Performance Report, which measures our progress in achieving 37 goals. These goals emphasize (1) adding value by achieving impact on issues of importance to the Corporation and our other stakeholders; (2) fostering effective communications with our stakeholders; (3) aligning human resources to support the OIG mission; and (4) managing our resources effectively. We met or substantially met 31, or 84 percent, of the 37 goals. We also completed our seventh client survey to solicit views of corporate management on the products and processes of our office. Both of these initiatives are helping to guide us as we pursue a new approach to planning the future direction and strategic focus of our office.

In connection with the changing environment of the OIG, I must also mention the many changes that the Corporation as a whole has experienced over the past months, particularly in its governance structure. Former Vice Chairman John Reich is now the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision and in that new capacity continues to be a member of the FDIC Board, along with newly appointed Director John Dugan, the Comptroller of the Currency. Martin Gruenberg assumed his position as Vice Chairman of the FDIC in August 2005, and it has been a pleasure to work with him, particularly in his new role as Chairman of the FDIC Audit Committee. I look forward to continued coordination with him and other senior leadership of the FDIC as we all seek to ensure stability and public confidence in the nation’s financial system.

Finally, a disastrous event occurred in early September that could have undermined that very stability and public confidence in the Gulf Coast region—Hurricane Katrina. The FDIC responded promptly by establishing a center staffed 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, by FDIC volunteers. The goal was to assist bank customers with a wide range of problems, such as how to access their accounts, and to gather and convey information regarding the operations of affected institutions. A number of other initiatives to help bankers through the hurricane’s aftermath are underway. Significantly, as we were going to press, after more than 4 years with the FDIC, Chairman Donald Powell was named by the President to serve as the federal coordinator for long-term hurricane recovery efforts and will soon be leaving the Corporation. We wish him well in this critical endeavor.

The OIG also took a number of actions in response to the hurricane, including participating in the Department of Justice Hurricane Katrina Fraud Task Force, communicating with other federal Inspectors General about the governmentwide response to the storm, creating a Web page for financial institutions and consumers to report instances of fraud, providing volunteer resources in support of the Center for Missing and Exploited Children, and meeting with audit representatives from other financial regulatory OIGs to coordinate possible future work related to relief and rebuilding activities. I appreciate the commitment and concern of all OIG staff who have stepped up to help. In the true spirit of public service, we will continue to monitor the impact of Katrina on the financial services industry and do whatever we can to assist fellow citizens in the aftermath of this tragedy.

Patricia M. Black Deputy Inspector General October 31, 2005

Management and Performance Challenges

The Management and Performance Challenges section of our report presents OIG results of audits, evaluations, and other reviews carried out during the reporting period in the context of the OIG’s view of the most significant management and performance challenges facing the Corporation. We identified the following seven management and performance challenges and, in the spirit of the Reports Consolidation Act of 2000, we presented our assessment of them to the Chief Financial Officer of the FDIC in December 2004. The Act calls for these challenges to be presented in the FDIC’s consolidated performance and accountability report. The FDIC includes such reporting as part of its Annual Report. Our work has been and continues to be largely designed to address these challenges and thereby help ensure the FDIC’s successful accomplishment of its mission.

	Corporate Governance in Insured Depository Institutions
	Management and Analysis of Risks to the Insurance Funds
	Security Management
	Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing
	Protection of Consumer Interests
	Corporate Governance in the FDIC
	Resolution and Receivership Activities

OIG work conducted to address these areas during the current reporting period includes 23 audit and evaluation reviews containing questioned costs of $981,355 and 39 nonmonetary recommendations; investigations addressing a number of the areas of challenge; comments and input to the Corporation’s draft policies in significant operational areas; participation at meetings, symposia, conferences, and other forums to jointly address issues of concern to the Corporation and the OIG; and other assistance provided to the Corporation.

Investigations: Making an Impact

In the Investigations section of our report, we feature the results of work performed by OIG agents in Washington, D.C.; Atlanta; Dallas; and Chicago. OIG agents conduct investigations of alleged criminal or otherwise prohibited activities impacting the FDIC and its programs. In conducting investigations, the OIG works closely with U.S. Attorneys’ Offices throughout the country in attempting to bring to justice individuals who have defrauded the FDIC. The legal skills and outstanding direction provided by Assistant United States Attorneys with whom we work are critical to our success. The results we are reporting for the last 6 months reflect the efforts of U.S. Attorneys’ Offices throughout the United States. Our write-ups also reflect our partnering with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Internal Revenue Service, and other law enforcement agencies in conducting investigations of joint interest. Additionally, we acknowledge the invaluable assistance of the FDIC’s Divisions and Offices with whom we work closely to bring about successful investigations.

Investigative work during the period led to indictments or criminal charges against 22 individuals and convictions of 19 defendants. Criminal charges remained pending against 34 individuals as of the end of the reporting period. Fines, restitutions, and recoveries resulting from our cases totaled approximately $5.4 million. This section of our report also includes a brief update on the work of our Electronic Crimes Unit and cites acknowledgements given to several of our Special Agents and to others with whom we work.

OIG Organization: Pursuing OIG Goals

In the Organization section of our report, we note some of the significant internal activities that the FDIC OIG has pursued during the past 6 months in furtherance of our four strategic goals and corresponding objectives. These activities complement and support the audit, evaluation, and investigative work discussed in the earlier sections of our report. Activities of OIG Counsel and cumulative OIG results covering the past five reporting periods are also shown in this section. In the interest of transparency and accountability, we are also providing a summary of our Fiscal Year 2005 Performance Report.

Statistical Information

The Appendix of our report contains much of the statistical information required under the Inspector General Act, as amended.

Other Material

We bid farewell to retired OIG staff members whose contributions to our office are very much appreciated. We also provide a listing of abbreviations and acronyms. Finally, we congratulate 2005 President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency Award Winners.

	The Office of Audits issues 23 reports containing total questioned costs of $981,355 and 39 nonmonetary recommendations to improve corporate operations and activities. Among these are recommendations to strengthen the compliance examination process, enhance the central data repository project management, and strengthen controls related to FDIC employee travel.
	OIG investigations result in 22 indictments/ informations; 19 convictions; and approximately $5.4 million in total fines, restitution, and other monetary recoveries.
	OIG Counsel provides advice and counsel to OIG staff on a number of issues, including applicability of privacy-related laws and regulations to the FDIC, and banking law matters related to compliance examinations and corrective and enforcement actions. Counsel is involved in 28 litigation matters, 3 of which were resolved during the reporting period and the remainder of which are awaiting further action.
	The OIG reviews and comments on 3 proposed formal regulations, 1 legislative proposal—the Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2005, 16 proposed FDIC policies and directives, and responds to 4 requests under the Freedom of Information Act. Substantive comments are provided to the Corporation related to proposed policies on various aspects of information technology security risk management and the risk-related premium system.
	The OIG completes its fifth FDIC information security evaluation, noting the Corporation’s significant progress in strengthening security controls and practices.
	The OIG coordinates with and assists management on a number of initiatives, including Office of Investigations and Office of Audits Executives’ participation at Division and Office meetings, administration of the OIG’s seventh client survey, and presentations as part of the Corporate Employee Program.
	The OIG announces and implements downsizing and reorganization initiatives and takes step to enhance officewide strategic planning efforts.
	The OIG accomplishes a number of internal office initiatives, including establishing a mentoring program, actively participating in e-learning opportunities, and participating in numerous interagency working groups and roundtables through the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency.
	OIG Special Agent is acknowledged by the U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of Connecticut, for exemplary work in a joint investigation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation Division in the prosecution of the former Chairman of the Board of Directors of Connecticut Bank of Commerce.
	The OIG issues its Fiscal Year 2005 Performance Report wherein we report that we met or substantially met 84 percent of our performance goals.
	The OIG coordinates with corporate management to address an incident involving unauthorized release of FDIC employee data and meets with congressional staff to discuss the matter. The OIG initiates several assignments related to protection of personal information – both internal to the FDIC and with respect to the institutions it supervises.
	The OIG formulates the audit and evaluation assignment plan for fiscal year 2005 and consults and coordinates with FDIC management and congressional staff in doing so.

We identified the following challenges, and the Corporation included them in its 2004 Annual Report:

1. Corporate Governance in Insured Depository Institutions



2. Management and Analysis of Risks to the Insurance Funds



3. Security Management



4. Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing



5. Protection of Consumers’ Interests



6. Corporate Governance in the FDIC



7. Resolution and Receivership Activities

Corporate Governance in Insured Depository Institutions

Corporate governance is generally defined as the fulfillment of the broad stewardship responsibilities entrusted to the Board of Directors, officers, and external and internal auditors of a corporation. A number of well-publicized announcements of business and accountability failings, including those of financial institutions, have raised questions about the credibility of management oversight and accounting practices in the United States. In certain cases, board members and senior management engaged in high-risk activities without proper risk management processes, did not maintain adequate loan policies and procedures, and circumvented or disregarded various laws and banking regulations. In an increasingly consolidated financial industry, effective corporate governance is needed to ensure adequate stress testing and risk management processes covering the entire organization. Adequate corporate governance protects the depositor, institution, nation’s financial system, and FDIC in its role as deposit insurer. A lapse in corporate governance can lead to a rapid decline in public confidence, with potentially disastrous results to the institution.

With respect to financial institutions, in some cases, dominant officials have exercised undue control over operations to the institution’s detriment. In other cases, independent public accounting firms rendered clean opinions on the institutions’ financial statements when, in fact, the statements were materially misstated. Such events have increased public concern regarding the adequacy of corporate governance and, in part, prompted passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. This Act has focused increased attention on management assessments of internal controls over financial reporting and the external auditor attestations of these assessments. Strong stewardship along with reliable financial reports from insured depository institutions are critical to FDIC mission achievement.

The FDIC has initiated various measures designed to mitigate risks posed by these concerns, such as reviewing the bank’s board activities and ethics policies and practices and reviewing auditor independence requirements. In fact, many of the Sarbanes- Oxley Act requirements parallel those already applicable to the FDIC under the FDIC Improvement Act. The FDIC also reviews the publicly traded companies’ compliance with Securities and Exchange Commission regulations and the approved and recommended policies of the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council to help ensure accurate and reliable financial reporting through an effective external auditing program and on-site FDIC examination.

Our investigative work is one way of addressing corporate governance issues. In a number of cases, financial institution fraud is a principal contributing factor to an institution’s failure. Unfortunately, the principals of some of these institutions—that is, those most expected to ensure safe and sound corporate governance—are at times the parties perpetrating the fraud. Our Office of Investigations plays a critical role in addressing such activity. (See the Investigations section of this report for specific examples of bank fraud cases involving corporate governance weaknesses.)

Management and Analysis of Risks to the Insurance Funds

A primary goal of the FDIC under its insurance program is to ensure that its deposit insurance funds do not require augmentation by the U.S. Treasury. Achieving this goal is a challenge that requires effective communication and coordination with the other federal banking agencies. The FDIC engages in an ongoing process of proactively identifying risks to the deposit insurance funds and adjusting the risk-based deposit insurance premiums charged to the institutions. The consolidations that have occurred among banks, securities firms, insurance companies, and other financial services providers resulting from the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act involve increasingly diversified activities and associated inherent risks.

In some instances, bank mergers have created “large banks,” which are generally defined as institutions with assets of over $25 billion. As of June 30, 2005 the 25 largest banks controlled $5.64 trillion (54 percent) of total bank assets in the country. The FDIC is the primary federal regulator for only 2 of these 25 institutions.

To address the risks associated with large banks for which the FDIC is the insurer but is not the primary federal regulator, the FDIC has established the Large Bank Section in the Division of Supervision and Consumer Protection (DSC). A key effort is the Dedicated Examiner Program for the largest banks in the United States. One senior examiner from the FDIC is dedicated to each institution and participates in targeted reviews or attends management meetings. Additionally, case managers closely monitor such institutions through the Large Insured Depository Institutions Program’s quarterly analysis and executive summaries and consistently remain in communication with their counterparts at the other regulatory agencies.

For large banks, under Basel II, capital will be determined by the banks’ internal estimates of risk. The FDIC and other regulators are evaluating policy options to ensure that institutions and the industry as a whole maintain adequate capital and reserves. Meanwhile, the FDIC and other regulators must work to ensure that they have staff with necessary expertise to understand and evaluate the adequacy of the institutions’ capital models.

Another area of challenge for the Corporation relates to industrial loan companies (ILCs). The FDIC is the primary federal regulator for a number of ILCs, which are insured depository institutions owned by organizations that are subject to varying degrees of federal regulation. ILC charters allow mixing of banking and commerce which is otherwise prohibited for most other depository institutions owned by commercial firms.

Finally, there has been ongoing congressional consideration to merging the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) and Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF) in the hope that the merged fund would not only be stronger and better diversified but would also eliminate the concern about a deposit insurance premium disparity between the BIF and the SAIF. Assessments in the merged fund would be based on the risk that institutions pose to that fund. The prospect of different premium rates for identical deposit insurance coverage would be eliminated. The Corporation has worked hard to bring about deposit insurance reform and, as of the end of the reporting period, was expecting Congressional action in this regard.

Our work in this area included the following three audits.

MERIT Eligibility Process

The FDIC’s DSC is responsible for conducting streamlined safety and soundness examinations under the Maximum Efficiency, Risk-focused, Institution Targeted (MERIT) examination guidelines. Under MERIT, an FDIC Examiner-in-Charge determines the eligibility of an institution for a safety and soundness examination under MERIT guidelines during the pre-examination planning phase by applying MERIT eligibility criteria to the FDIC’s knowledge of an institution, its size, complexity, and risk profile. To place this program in perspective, from May 1, 2002, through September 30, 2004, the FDIC conducted 2,290 MERIT examinations.

During the reporting period, we conducted an audit to determine whether the FDIC’s process for determining an institution’s eligibility for an examination under MERIT guidelines adequately considered the appropriate risk factors, and we concluded that it did. The MERIT eligibility criteria include a range of appropriate banking risk indicators that should identify those institutions with a higher risk profile that do not qualify for a streamlined examination. Also, about 18 months after launching this streamlined examination program, the FDIC conducted an evaluation of the MERIT guidelines that resulted in expanding, strengthening, and revising the MERIT eligibility criteria. Further, for the examinations we reviewed, examiners adequately applied the FDIC’s MERIT eligibility criteria and screening process performed during pre-examination planning to provide reasonable assurance that only low-risk institutions qualified for a MERIT examination.

However, we found that the 33 pre-examination planning memoranda we reviewed did not always clearly reflect the decisions made about an institution’s MERIT eligibility. In our view, additional information reflecting the MERIT eligibility decision would increase assurance that the MERIT criteria are adequately considered and that examination procedures are planned commensurate with the relevant existing and potential risks at an institution. We therefore made two recommendations for updating and clarifying preexamination planning guidance. FDIC management concurred with both of them.

Effectiveness of Supervisory Corrective Actions

The FDIC uses a number of tools to address supervisory concerns related to the safety and soundness of financial institutions and their compliance with laws and regulations. These tools range from informal advice and written agreements to formal actions that are legally enforceable. Supervisory corrective actions are tailored to each situation and address the specific problems at an institution.

We conducted an audit to determine whether supervisory corrective actions taken against FDIC-supervised institutions achieved the intended purposes before being terminated. Our audit focused on the FDIC’s use of Cease and Desist orders and Memorandums of Understanding – two of the more commonly used supervisory corrective actions. We found that sufficient controls are in place and operating effectively to ensure that supervisory corrective actions achieve their intended purposes before being terminated.

We also found that DSC could improve the timeliness and completeness of data in its Formal and Informal Action Tracking system (FIAT). Information for 14 of the 15 actions we reviewed often was not entered into the system in a timely or complete manner. In addition, the system did not include formal enforcement actions that state regulators independently issued to FDIC-supervised institutions. As a result, DSC cannot fully rely on the FIAT data and management reports for monitoring supervisory corrective actions.

Our report contains three recommendations intended to improve the timeliness and completeness of FIAT data. FDIC management agreed with the recommendations.

Capital Provisions Established Under Supervisory Corrective Actions

We conducted an audit to determine whether DSC’s process is adequate for determining capital provision requirements established under supervisory corrective actions for problem banks.

We concluded that DSC has been successful in using capital provisions as part of overall supervisory actions to improve the financial structure of problem institutions, and its related processes are adequate. Also, examiners were analyzing capital adequacy and the bank’s adherence to supervisory corrective action capital provisions in accordance with DSC policies. We also found, however, that supervisory personnel were not recommending capital provisions that encompass all of the Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) capital ratios. As a result, the established capital provisions did not ensure that banks stay adequately capitalized as defined by the PCA capital categories.

We recommended that DSC revise guidance to supervisory personnel regarding the use and consideration of PCA capital ratios in the formulation and recommendation of capital provision requirements. DSC generally concurred with the findings of the report and agreed to implement the recommendation.

Security Management

The FDIC relies heavily upon automated information systems to collect, process, and store vast amounts of banking information. This information is used by financial regulators, academia, and the public to assess market and institution conditions, develop regulatory policy, and conduct research and analysis on important banking issues. Ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of this information in an environment of increasingly sophisticated security threats requires a strong, enterprise-wide information security program at the FDIC and insured depository institutions. It also requires compliance with applicable statutes and policies aimed at promoting information security throughout the federal government. One such statute is Title III of the E-Government Act of 2002, commonly referred to as the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA). As a result of focused efforts over the past several years, and as illustrated in Figure 1, the FDIC has made significant progress in improving its information security controls and practices and addressing current and emerging information security requirements mandated by FISMA.

[ ] [ D ]

Also with respect to security management, the FDIC and insured depository institutions need to continue to ensure that sound disaster recovery and business continuity planning is present to safeguard depositors, investors, and others who depend on the financial services.

Federal Information Security Management Act

We issued three products to satisfy our FISMA reporting responsibilities: an Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Security Questions Report, a Privacy Information Report, and our comprehensive Security Evaluation Report with Scorecard. We reported that the FDIC has made significant progress in improving its information security controls and practices and additional improvements were underway at the time of our evaluation. We identified no significant deficiencies as defined by the OMB that warrant consideration as a potential material weakness. We did note, however, that management attention is needed in several key security control areas to ensure that appropriate risk-based and cost-effective security controls are in place to secure the FDIC’s information resources and further the Corporation’s security goals and objectives. Consequently, we concluded that the FDIC had established and implemented management controls that provided limited assurance over its information resources.

We identified steps that the Corporation can take to strengthen its information security program and practices. These related to: enhancing the FDIC’s inventory of information systems and categorizing the systems based on impact levels; enhancing the information security risk management program; improving contractor oversight and the effectiveness of disaster recovery tests; and integrating security standards in the enterprise architecture and better integrating security processes.

The Corporation has begun to develop plans of action and milestones to address the actions we suggested.

Controls Over the Risk-Related Premium System

The Risk-Related Premium System (RRPS) is the FDIC’s system of record for the risk assessment classification of financial institutions. This system contains examination and supervisory action information that is considered highly sensitive and is not available to the public. The insurance premium assessed to each institution is based on the balance of assessable deposits held during the preceding two quarters and on the degree of risk the institution poses to the BIF or the SAIF. The FDIC uses a risk-based premium system that assesses higher rates on those institutions that pose greater risks to the insurance fund.

The RRPS calculates assessment rates based on data from such sources as the institutions’ Call Reports; Thrift Financial Reports; examination data from the FDIC, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Reserve Board, and Office of Thrift Supervision; and input from FDIC personnel. In an audit we conducted during the period, we wanted to determine whether the RRPS application provides the appropriate level of confidentiality, data integrity, and availability through the use of effective management, operational, and technical controls.

We concluded that the controls for the RRPS provide reasonable assurance of adequate security. Additionally, in August 2005, the FDIC started the certification and accreditation process for the RRPS, which includes extensive testing of the key controls.

Although key application controls generally operated as intended, we identified several deficiencies that posed risks to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system:

	the RRPS security plan did not fully and accurately describe the current management, operational, and technical controls;
	a software configuration management plan was not fully developed or implemented; and
	read and write access rights of RRPS users were not periodically reviewed.

We therefore made three recommendations to address these risks. FDIC management agreed with the recommendations and has taken actions to address them.

Configuration Management Controls Over Operating System Software

Configuration management is a critical control for ensuring the integrity, security, and reliability of information systems. Absent a disciplined process for managing software changes, management cannot be assured that systems will operate as intended, that software defects will be minimized, and that configuration changes will be made in an efficient and timely manner. We engaged International Business Machines (IBM) Business Consulting to conduct an audit to determine whether the FDIC had established and implemented configuration management controls over its operating system software that were consistent with federal standards and guidelines and industry-accepted practices.

IBM’s audit concluded that the FDIC had established and implemented a number of configuration management controls over its operating system software that were consistent with federal standards and guidelines and industry-accepted practices. Such controls included a software patch management policy, a change control board, and periodic scanning of operating system software configurations.

These actions were positive; however, control improvements were needed. Specifically, the FDIC needed to establish an organizational policy and system-specific procedures to ensure proper configuration of operating system software. The FDIC also needed to standardize and integrate the recording, tracking, and reporting of operating system software configuration changes to the extent practical.

We made five recommendations to address these matters, and management has either initiated or plans to initiate actions to address them.

Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing

The nation continues to face the global threat of terrorism. In response to this threat, the Congress enacted the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Public Law 107-56 (USA PATRIOT Act), which expands the Treasury Department’s authority initially established under the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 (BSA) to regulate the activities of U.S. financial institutions, particularly their relations with individuals and entities with foreign ties. Specifically, the USA PATRIOT Act expands the BSA beyond its original purpose of deterring and detecting money laundering to also address terrorist financing activities. In today’s global banking environment, where funds are transferred instantly and communication systems make services available internationally, a lapse at even a small financial institution outside of a major metropolitan area can have significant implications across the nation. The reality today is that all institutions are at risk of being used to facilitate criminal activities, including terrorist financing.

Through its examiners, the FDIC seeks to ensure that institutions have a strong BSA program to address money laundering and terrorist financing concerns. While many FDIC-supervised institutions are diligent in their efforts to establish, execute, and administer effective BSA compliance programs, there have been instances where controls and efforts were lacking. When such instances are identified in the course of examinations, the FDIC may request bank management to address the deficiencies in a written response to the FDIC, outlining the corrective action proposed and establishing a timeframe for implementation, or the FDIC may pursue an enforcement action.

In addition, in September 2004, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), an arm of the U.S. Treasury Department, signed an information-sharing Memorandum of Understanding with the federal banking agencies, including the FDIC. The Memorandum of Understanding requires an increased level of BSA reporting and accountability between the federal banking agencies and FinCEN. In June 2005, the FDIC, in conjunction with the other federal banking regulators, issued revisions to its BSA examination procedures.

The continuing challenge facing the FDIC is to ensure that banks maintain effective BSA programs that will ultimately create an environment where attempts to use the American financial system for money laundering or terrorist financing will be identified and ultimately thwarted.

Planned OIG work for fiscal year 2006 includes an audit to determine whether the FDIC is effectively using FinCEN data and tools in assessing the BSA and anti-money laundering programs of FDIC-supervised financial institutions. Another audit will determine the extent to which examiners are following BSA examination procedures for foreign transactions.

Protection of Consumers’ Interests

In addition to its mission of maintaining public confidence in the nation’s financial system, the FDIC also serves as an advocate for consumers through its oversight of a variety of statutory and regulatory requirements aimed at protecting consumers from unfair and unscrupulous banking practices. The FDIC is legislatively mandated to enforce various statutes and regulations regarding consumer protection and civil rights with respect to state-chartered, nonmember banks and to encourage community investment initiatives by these institutions.

The FDIC accomplishes its mission of protecting consumers under various laws and regulations by conducting compliance examinations and Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) evaluations. The FDIC takes enforcement actions to address compliance violations, encourages public involvement in the community reinvestment process, assists financial institutions with fair lending and consumer compliance through education and guidance, and provides assistance to various parties within and outside of the FDIC. The Corporation has also developed a program to examine institution compliance with privacy laws.

The Corporation has emphasized financial literacy, aimed specifically at low- and moderate-income people who may not have had banking relationships, and the Corporation’s “Money Smart” initiative is a key outreach effort in that regard. In a related vein, protecting consumers from unscrupulous banking practices also continues to be a challenging aspect of consumer protection.

Finally, and importantly, the number of reported instances of identity theft has greatly increased in recent years, and the consequences to consumers can be devastating. The Corporation will need to remain vigilant in conducting comprehensive, risk-based compliance examinations that ensure the protection of consumer interests, analyzing and responding appropriately to consumer complaints, and educating individuals on money management topics, including identity protection and how to avoid becoming victims of various consumer scams. A challenge facing the FDIC and other regulators is protecting consumer interests while minimizing regulatory burden. The FDIC, Federal Reserve Board, and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency jointly approved amendments to CRA regulations, effective September 1, 2005, that preserve the importance of community Development in the CRA evaluations of the banks.

DSC’s Risk-Focused Compliance Examination Process

In June 2003, the FDIC’s DSC revised its program for examining institutional compliance with consumer protection laws and regulations. Under the new program, DSC compliance examinations combine a risk-based examination process with an in-depth evaluation of an institution’s compliance management system, resulting in a top-down, risk-focused approach to examinations. We conducted an audit to determine whether DSC’s risk-focused compliance examination program results in examinations that are adequately planned and effective in assessing financial institution compliance with consumer protection laws and regulations.

We found that DSC examiners generally complied with the policies and procedures related to risk-scoping compliance examinations and that the Risk Profile and Scoping Memorandums prepared by examiners provided an adequate basis for planned examination coverage. The examiners reviewed bank policies, procedures, disclosures, and forms for compliance with consumer protection laws and regulations for each examination we reviewed and planned for transaction testing or spot checks in all compliance areas over the course of two consecutive examinations – a period of 2 to 6 years, depending on an institution’s size and ratings. Additionally, examiners conducted transaction testing or spot checks in those areas for which violations had been found at previous compliance examinations.

However, we found that examination documentation did not always show the transaction testing or spot checks conducted during the on-site portion of the examinations, including testing to ensure the reliability of the institutions’ compliance review functions. Examiners also did not always document whether the examination reviewed all the compliance areas in the planned scope of review. As a result, DSC cannot assure that the extent of testing was appropriate except for those areas in which examiners had identified violations and included them in Reports of Examination.

We recommended that DSC clarify and reinforce requirements that examiners adequately document the scope of the work performed, including transaction testing and spot checks of the reliability of the institutions’ compliance review functions, during the on-site portions of compliance examinations. FDIC management agreed with the recommendation and has taken corrective action.

Ongoing work in the consumer protection area includes an audit of the FDIC’s efforts to address predatory lending. Two other audits are assessing (1) bank service providers’ protection of sensitive customer information and (2) DSC’s institution and examination guidance for implementing data privacy and security provisions of Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and the Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act. (See also the Investigations section of this report regarding the Office of Investigations’ consumer protection-related work.)

Corporate Governance in the FDIC

Corporate governance within the FDIC is the responsibility of the Board of Directors, officers, and operating managers in fulfilling the Corporation’s broad mission functions. It also provides the structure for setting goals and objectives, the means to attaining those goals and objectives, and ways of monitoring performance. Management of the FDIC’s corporate resources is essential for efficiently achieving the FDIC’s program goals and objectives.

Also, the Administration has outlined management initiatives for departments and major agencies in the President’s Management Agenda (PMA). These initiatives are (1) strategic management of human capital, (2) competitive sourcing, (3) improved financial management, (4) expanded electronic government, and (5) budget and performance integration.

Although the FDIC is not subject to the PMA, it has given priority attention to continuing efforts to improve operational efficiency and effectiveness, consistent with the PMA.

We discuss corporate governance challenges at the FDIC under seven different categories below.

Management of Human Capital

Since 2002, the FDIC has been working to create a flexible permanent workforce that is poised to respond to sudden changes in the financial sector. FDIC executives announced workforce planning initiatives providing for human resources flexibilities, established a Corporate Employee Program, implemented a Buyout Program, and reorganized major corporate divisions and functions. The FDIC’s training and development function, known as the FDIC Corporate University (CU), is a key ingredient in the implementation of the FDIC’s Corporate Employee Program and other corporate efforts to address skill and competency requirements.

The FDIC’s Corporate University
In 2003, the FDIC established the CU as a separate FDIC office to serve as the corporate umbrella over Training and Development (T&D), with responsibility for overseeing, coordinating, and supporting the assessment, design, development, delivery, and evaluation of division and office T&D programs.

We conducted an evaluation to assess (1) the degree to which CU has implemented training programs and other developmental opportunities to help the FDIC build the competencies needed to achieve its mission and strategic goals and (2) the overall cost-effectiveness of the CU structure in comparison to initial goals and industry benchmarks.

We evaluated CU’s implementation of training programs and developmental opportunities using the Government Accountability Office Guide for Assessing Strategic Training and Development Efforts in the Federal Government, which presents core characteristics for successful T&D programs. Overall, we concluded that CU has addressed, to varying degrees, each of the following Government Accountability Office core characteristics:

	Strategic alignment
	Leadership commitment and communication
	Stakeholder involvement
	Accountability and recognition
	Effective resource allocation
	Partnerships and learning from others
	Data quality assurance
	Continuous performance improvement

With regard to cost-effectiveness of the CU structure, the FDIC’s 2005 budgeted T&D costs were lower than 2002 budgeted training costs. Further, we determined that CU training costs, based on a percentage of payroll, were in line with industry benchmarks. CU’s ratio of training staff to employees was within the range of other selected banking regulators. Moreover, the FDIC’s ratio does not consider training that CU provides to non-FDIC employees.

Competitive Sourcing

The FDIC awarded long-term contracts to consolidate outsourced information technology activities. The contract combined approximately 40 contracts into 1 contract with multiple vendors for a total program value of $555 million over 10 years. The Corporation may face challenges in getting work completed and overseeing the large task orders.

In an audit planned for fiscal year 2006, we will address whether the task orders are being awarded consistent with sound procurement practices.

Improved Financial Management

The FDIC fielded a new financial management system during 2005 designed to consolidate the operations of multiple systems. Named the New Financial Environment (NFE), this initiative seeks to modernize the FDIC’s financial reporting capabilities. Implementing NFE and interfacing other systems with NFE has required significant corporate efforts and resources.

Two audits during the reporting period addressed NFE issues, as discussed below.

NFE Testing
We engaged KPMG LLP to perform an audit of NFE testing. The audit concluded that the FDIC had developed a rigorous multi-stage test strategy and schedule for the NFE to ensure it would function as designed and meet users’ needs. However, KPMG found that improvements were needed in various testing phases of NFE. As a result, financial management system integrity and financial reporting risks may not have been mitigated to an acceptable level at the time KPMG completed its audit work. We provided details of these findings as they were identified to the Division of Finance (DOF) and NFE project management team to facilitate timely corrective action and response where appropriate. We recommended that DOF and the NFE project management team review the risks identified and develop a risk resolution and action approach in accordance with the risk mitigation procedures outlined in the NFE risk management plan. Management’s response to our audit addressed our concerns.

NFE System and Data Conversion
As referenced in our previous semiannual report, KPMG also began an audit seeking to review NFE system and data conversion activities. The audit objective was to determine whether systems and data conversion plans and activities were adequate to minimize the risk of errors and omissions during NFE implementation. FDIC management informed us that providing the OIG access to information would “definitely impact” the NFE implementation schedule given the timing of planned audit tests and procedures relative to its implementation. As a result, we terminated the audit on April 6, 2005, to avoid delaying NFE implementation. We issued a report during the current reporting period summarizing KPMG’s findings up to audit termination.

KPMG disclaimed from providing assurance with respect to the audit objective. KPMG was unable to collect sufficient, competent, and relevant evidence in a timely manner as required by generally accepted government auditing standards to provide a reasonable basis for audit conclusions related to the audit objective.

KPMG expressed reservations about the lack of detailed data conversion, validation, and clean-up plans for the asset management, general ledger, vendor, purchase order, accounts receivable, and cash management functions. Lack of detailed plans for these functions could have increased the likelihood of errors and omissions during the conversion process. KPMG also noted the lack of a detailed performance test plan and omitted tests that could have impacted or interrupted NFE operations. The report contained no recommendations, and a response was not required.

The FDIC’s DOF responded that the conversion activity planning and execution, coupled with the active involvement of data owners from the impacted business areas in planning, testing, and validation, provided a high degree of confidence that the conversion of data would result in minimal and manageable operational disruption and conversion errors. Regarding performance testing, management indicated that “tuning” of a few functions has continued following NFE implementation. This process was expected to continue for several months, but no interruptions or delays in service were anticipated.

The FDIC’s Investment Policies
The Secretary of the Treasury requires the FDIC to invest its non-appropriated cash held in the BIF and SAIF (hereafter, the Funds) through the Government Account Series Program. The FDIC seeks to maximize investment returns, subject to overriding liquidity considerations. The FDIC considers liquidity requirements and current and prospective market conditions, including U.S. Treasury security yields, when developing quarterly investment strategies.

We engaged the firm of Pricewaterhouse Coopers, LLP (PwC) to determine whether the FDIC’s investment strategy and portfolio management procedures provide the highest possible investment returns for the FDIC, taking into consideration the applicable legal and regulatory framework established for investments of the Funds.

PwC’s audit concluded that the FDIC’s DOF generally performed well in managing the FDIC’s investment portfolio in the context of the applicable legal and regulatory framework, stated investment strategy, interest rate environment, and assessment of certain insured institutions undergoing financial stress. PwC also found no instances of non-compliance with applicable laws and regulations.

PwC identified opportunities for the FDIC to improve the return on its investments through two broad courses of action:

	In certain market environments, the FDIC should decrease holdings in overnight certificates and increase holdings in longer-maturity securities. Such holdings reduce the volatility of returns, but fail to enhance liquidity, because the Government Account Series Program investments enjoy virtually perfect transactional liquidity.
	Explore the possibility of changes in the FDIC’s investment approach, such as expanding the universe of allowable investments.

The report recommended that the Corporation consider the following actions:

	Performing an internal review of investment policies to determine, among other things, whether a limit on overnight certificates should be established.
	Using the portfolio market value for reserve ratio calculations.
	Adopting measurement techniques to compare plans with actual results.
	Effective resource allocation

PwC also recommended:

	Establishing goals based on volatility as opposed to liquidity.
	Retaining outside expertise to conduct periodic reviews.

When we issued our final report, three of our five recommendations were unresolved. As of the date of issuance of this semiannual report, in conjunction with FDIC program officials, the FDIC Audit Committee, and the FDIC Chairman, we have resolved all matters. With respect to establishing a dollar limit on overnight investment holdings in the BIF and SAIF in excess of the limit requiring approval, management did not agree that the additional control was needed. The OIG continues to believe that this control has value; however, management has given the recommendation sufficient consideration and provided adequate support for its position. Regarding the retention of outside experts to conduct reviews, the FDIC’s management decision was that such a review would be appropriate, and management has requested the OIG to conduct an independent audit of the corporate investment program every 3 years, including policies applicable to the National Liquidation Fund. A final unresolved recommendation concerned adopting measurement techniques to compare plans with actual results. At a meeting with FDIC program representatives subsequent to issuance of our final report, we received additional information concerning fund performance management and reporting. This information, together with the audit results that the FDIC generally performed well in managing the investment portfolio, supports the FDIC’s position that sufficient action is taken to measure investment returns.

E-Government

The FDIC’s E-Government Strategy is a component of the enterprise architecture that focuses on service delivery for the external customers of the FDIC. The FDIC has initiated a number of projects that will enable the Corporation to improve internal operations, communications, and service to members of the public, businesses, and other government offices. The projects include: Call Report Modernization, Virtual Supervisory Information on the Net, Asset Servicing Technology Enhancement Project, NFE, Corporate Human Resources Information System, and FDICconnect. The risks of not implementing e-government principles are that the FDIC will not efficiently communicate and serve its internal and external customers.

Implementation of E-Government Principles
We conducted an audit related to the FDIC’s E-Government activities. We limited our work to obtaining an understanding of the FDIC’s progress on E-Government initiatives because the FDIC had not yet developed a comprehensive E-Government strategic plan.

We determined that the FDIC has made progress in implementing various initiatives that are consistent with E-Government principles and implementing guidance from OMB. In addition, the Corporation has taken steps to develop a comprehensive E-Government strategic plan that will be linked to associated corporate goals and objectives in areas addressed by OMB’s Scorecard and the E-Government Act guidance. The Corporation had established a milestone of December 31, 2005 for the approval of a new E-Government strategic plan. It actually adopted a plan in September 2005.

Although we did not make recommendations, our report suggested that in completing the new E-Government strategic plan, the Corporation be mindful of OMB’s guidance that E-Government performance measures must be linked to the Corporation’s Annual Performance Plan and Strategic Plan and desired outcomes of E-Government initiatives must be identified.

Risk Management and Assessment of Corporate Performance

Within the business community, there is a heightened awareness of the need for a robust risk management program. Because of past corporate governance breakdowns at some major corporations, organizations are seeking a “portfolio” view of risks and the launch of proactive measures against threats that could disrupt the achievement of strategic goals and objectives. To address these needs, a best practice has developed—enterprise risk management. Enterprise risk management is a process designed to: identify potential events that may affect the entity, manage identified risks, and provide reasonable assurance regarding how identified risks will affect the achievement of entity objectives. The Office of Enterprise Risk Management (OERM) is responsible for developing an enterprise risk management program for the FDIC. The migration from internal control to enterprise risk management perspectives and activities presents challenges and opportunities for the FDIC.

In the spirit of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, the FDIC prepares a strategic plan that outlines its mission, vision, and strategic goals and objectives within the context of its three major business lines; an annual performance plan that translates the vision and goals of the strategic plan into measurable annual goals, targets, and indicators; and an annual performance report that compares actual results against planned goals. In addition, the FDIC Chairman develops a supplemental set of “stretch” annual corporate performance objectives based on three strategic areas of focus that cut across the Corporation’s three business lines: Sound Policy, Stability, and Stewardship.

The Corporation is continually focused on establishing and meeting annual performance goals that are outcome-oriented, linking performance goals and budgetary resources, implementing processes to verify and validate reported performance data, and addressing cross-cutting issues and programs that affect other federal financial institution regulatory agencies.

OIG efforts addressing risk management and corporate performance assessment during the reporting period included the following.

Corporate Planning Follow-Up
In response to a request by the Corporation’s Chief Financial Officer, we performed a follow-up evaluation of a July 2001 study of the Corporate Planning Cycle (CPC) that we had conducted jointly with the FDIC Office of Internal Control Management, now OERM. The objectives of the most recent review were to: determine whether DOF has been successful in reducing resources dedicated to the CPC and streamlining the CPC process; assess the FDIC’s success in integrating budget and performance goal information; and benchmark the Corporation’s CPC process against other agreed-upon agencies’ or organizations’ processes.

We concluded that DOF has made progress in reducing resources dedicated to the CPC and streamlining the CPC process. Most division and office representatives indicated that the resources and time required for the 2005 budget formulation process had been reduced. DOF streamlined the cycle time for the budget formulation exercise from over 6 months for the 2001 budget to 3 months for the 2005 budget. Nevertheless, division and office representatives expressed concerns regarding several areas in the budget process, and we concluded that DOF could make several improvements to the FDIC’s planning and budget process.

The FDIC has also made progress in integrating budget and performance goal information. For the 2005 corporate operating budget, the FDIC used an approach that involved senior management decisions on strategic and annual initiatives at the onset of the budget formulation exercise; provided budget representatives planning and budget formulation guidelines developed through senior management discussion; and required divisions and offices to review and provide input for performance plans, performance objectives, and proposed baseline operating budgets. This approach was an improvement over the 2001 CPC process wherein the staffing, budgeting, and planning processes overlapped and were not as well integrated.

Our report contained three recommendations to help ensure that divisions and offices have adequate information to review and respond to (1) proposed budgets in the areas of information technology services and external training and (2) requests for proposed increases or decreases to their respective budgets. Another recommendation was intended to help the FDIC communicate and institutionalize the streamlined planning and budget process.

DOF generally concurred with our four recommendations, and we consider management’s actions taken or planned responsive. We benchmarked the FDIC’s CPC process against other selected federal agencies’ planning and budget processes and provided this information for management’s use.

Management of Major Projects

Project management involves defining, planning, scheduling, and controlling the tasks that must be completed to reach a goal and allocating resources to perform those tasks. The FDIC has engaged in several multi-million dollar projects, such as the NFE project discussed earlier, Central Data Repository, and Virginia Square Phase II Construction. Without effective project management, the FDIC runs the risk that corporate requirements and user needs may not be met in a timely, cost-effective manner.

In September 2002, the FDIC established the Capital Investment Review Committee (CIRC) as the control framework for determining whether a proposed investment is appropriate for the FDIC Board of Directors’ consideration, overseeing approved investments throughout their life cycle, and providing quarterly capital investment reports to the Board. The CIRC generally monitors projects valued at more than $3 million. The FDIC later developed the Chief Information Officer’s Council to recommend and oversee technology strategies, priorities, and progress. The work of the Council encompasses the entire portfolio of technology projects, including those below the threshold addressed by the CIRC.

Beginning with the 2003 budget, the FDIC began budgeting and tracking capital investment expenses as a separate component of the budget to enhance management’s ability to focus on such projects. Project funds established within the investment budget are to be available for the life of the project rather than for the fiscal year. Final responsibility for approving the initial creation or modification of a project’s capital investment budget rests with the FDIC’s Board of Directors. In addition, the Division of Information Technology has recently adopted the Rational Unified Process system development life cycle model and has established a Program Management Office. Both of these initiatives should result in additional oversight and control mechanisms for corporate projects.

Virginia Square Phase II Construction
As the Corporation’s Virginia Square Phase II construction project progressed, we conducted an evaluation to determine whether: (1) project costs were within budget and tasks were being completed on schedule, (2) the FDIC was following its established project control framework, and (3) the Division of Administration (DOA) had planned for space utilization in light of corporate downsizing.

We concluded that the Virginia Square Phase II project costs are within budget and that tasks are being completed on schedule. Also, the FDIC is effectively following its established project control framework. Further, DOA is planning for space utilization in light of corporate downsizing and has analyzed several options for disposition of vacant space at Virginia Square. We validated most of the assumptions used in those options. The report contains no recommendations. However, we encouraged DOA to work with the Division of Information Technology to develop more precise estimates of anticipated on-site contractor staffing at Virginia Square because the cost-benefit of one of the options was, in part, dependent on a sufficient number of contractors performing work at Virginia Square.

CDR Project Management
Financial institutions regulated by the Call Report agencies are required to submit quarterly Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income, commonly referred to as Call Reports. To improve the regulatory call reporting process, the FDIC, on behalf of the Call Report agencies, entered into a $39 million contract with Unisys Corporation for the central data repository (CDR) system. The contract consists of a phased approach for implementing the new call reporting process. Among other benefits, the CDR system (1) would provide data to the industry more quickly in a manner that allows more flexibility for data analysis and (2) would increase efficiencies, resulting in a cost savings of $27 million over the 10-year life of the contract. The contract was modified in January 2005 to address industry feedback and allow more time for system testing and enrollment. The modification revised the system deployment date from October 2004 to September 2005. The CDR Steering Committee was established to oversee the system development effort under this contract and includes representatives from the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the FDIC.

During the reporting period we conducted an audit to determine whether CDR project management was adequate. We concluded that the CDR project management team had established adequate project management controls. However, the CDR project has been faced with both management and technical challenges associated with fielding new technology across multiple platforms, highly diverse users, and adopting new business practices associated with the call reporting process. The project team has been unable to overcome the challenges, and implementation of the CDR system was delayed for at least 1 year. This lack of progress raised concerns as to whether system functionality as originally envisioned could be attained. The report contains three recommendations intended to address the additional risks associated with the delayed implementation of system functionalities. The Corporation’s response to the draft report addressed the concerns we identified and was responsive to our recommendations.

Cost Containment and Procurement Integrity

As steward for the BIF, SAIF, and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation Resolution Fund, the FDIC strives to identify and implement measures to contain and reduce costs, either through more careful spending or by assessing and making changes in business processes to increase efficiency. A key challenge to containing costs relates to the contracting area. To assist the Corporation in accomplishing its mission, contractors provide a variety of services. To contain costs, the FDIC must ensure that its acquisition framework—its policies, procedures, and internal controls—is marked by sound planning; consistent use of competition; fairness; well-structured contracts designed to result in cost-effective, quality performance from contractors; and vigilant oversight management to ensure the receipt of goods and services at fair and reasonable prices.

Several of our assignments during the reporting period addressed cost containment and procurement issues. We evaluated two aspects of FDIC employee travel and also looked at the Corporation’s contract solicitation and evaluation process, as discussed below.

FDIC Management of Travel Costs
The FDIC contracted with the Scheduled Airlines Traffic Offices, Inc. (SatoTravel) to perform travel reservation services for FDIC employees. SatoTravel assists the FDIC’s travelers in making official travel arrangements that are consistent with the FDIC’s travel policies, cost considerations, and employee preferences, in that order. The FDIC executed the SatoTravel contract in August 2002 with 1 base year and four 1-year options. The total compensation ceiling for the 5-year contract period is $900,000. One of our evaluations during the reporting period was designed to determine whether the FDIC and SatoTravel are efficiently and effectively managing travel costs and requirements under the contract.

We determined that the FDIC can improve monitoring and controls over its travel program. Specifically, DOF suspended a requirement for bank examiners to make lodging reservations through SatoTravel, which, in turn, reduced the amount of rebates the FDIC received under the contract for hotel reservations. As a result, DOF is exceeding the SatoTravel contract compensation ceiling amount. We estimated that the FDIC may exceed the 5-year contract compensation ceiling price by $367,000—a contract increase of 40 percent. In late July 2005, DOA approved additional funding to cover anticipated contract costs through September 2006.

In addition, the FDIC could further reduce travel costs and increase program controls by increasing the number of travelers that stay in hotels that offer commissions to the FDIC and use SatoTravel’s on-line reservation system to make lodging arrangements. Further, DOF requires the use of the government-issued travel card only for airfare costs. Requiring the use of the government travel card for all travel costs, including airline, hotel, and car rental would achieve modest savings in the form of rebates from the travel card sponsor bank, strengthen management control over the travel program by providing better information for planning and negotiating travel services, and promote internal consistency.

Finally, most government agencies are required to use the General Services Administration’s (GSA) eTravel Program by 2006. The goal of the eTravel program is to centralize the federal government’s travel process and reduce administrative travel expenses. Although the FDIC is not required to use the eTravel program, it could improve or eventually replace the FDIC’s current travel program.

We made five recommendations to bring about improvements to the program. Management agreed with four of our five recommendations and considered but elected not to reinstate the policy requiring mandatory use of the national travel agency for bank examiners.

Inside Board Member and Executive Manager Travel
The FDIC General Travel Regulations (GTR) governs employee travel. The FDIC expects all employees traveling on official business to exercise the same prudent care in incurring reimbursable expenses as though traveling on personal business. The FDIC’s DOF is responsible for maintaining the GTR, processing travel expense reimbursement vouchers and, when appropriate, auditing travel claims. The FDIC’s Board of Directors and Executive Managers (EM) have heightened visibility as corporate leaders and frequently travel to represent the FDIC. (For the purpose of our report, we referred to both Executive Managers and inside Board members as EMs.)

We performed an evaluation to determine whether EM travel was authorized, approved, and paid in accordance with the GTR. Our review focused on temporary duty travel from July 1, 2002 through September 30, 2004 for 3 inside Board members and 89 EMs. We selected a judgmental sample of 25 vouchers based on traveler frequency and expense claim amounts.

We found that EM travel for the vouchers reviewed was not always authorized in accordance with the GTR, and travel claims that were paid were not always allowable. Further, neither supervisory reviews nor DOF audits of EM vouchers routinely detected unauthorized or unallowable claims. These control deficiencies over the administration of the FDIC’s travel program created an environment in which travel was not always authorized and expenses were not always claimed and paid according to the GTR.

We made recommendations related to reemphasizing certain travel policies to EMs, revising travel audit procedures, and ensuring that risk-based travel audits are effectively implemented.

Management agreed with four of our five recommendations and proposed an alternative action that sufficiently addresses the fifth recommendation. Management’s responsive actions were promptly communicated to all corporate EMs.

Contract Solicitation and Evaluation Process
We conducted an audit to determine if the FDIC (1) achieved adequate price competition in its contract solicitation process in order to obtain fair and reasonable prices for goods and services and (2) complied with the Acquisition Policy Manual (APM) solicitation and proposal evaluation requirements.

We determined that the Acquisition Services Branch generally complied with the APM’s solicitation and evaluation requirements. Further, the Acquisition Services Branch achieved adequate price competition for the purpose of obtaining fair and reasonable prices. However, the FDIC did not always request price reductions on contracts awarded through GSA’s Multiple Award Schedule (MAS) program. Requesting price reductions from MAS contractors could result in more favorable pricing due to market fluctuations that cause discounts to be offered.

We recommended that DOA revise the APM to require the contracting officer to seek price reductions on contracts awarded through GSA’s MAS program unless there are extenuating circumstances, or based on price analysis or other assessment, the contracting officer determines that the MAS contract price represents the best value at the lowest possible price. In such cases, the contracting officer should be required to document the reason for not seeking a price reduction.

DOA did not agree that the APM should be modified. However, DOA agreed that the contracting officer must adequately document the basis for determining that prices are fair and reasonable and represent the best value for the FDIC. DOA has reminded the contracting officers of their responsibility to evaluate and document price evaluations and has established a training program related to price evaluation. DOA’s alternative corrective actions were responsive.

Other work related to this challenge during the reporting period included two post-award contract billing audits. The billing reviews identified $981,355 in questioned costs. Management is currently addressing the findings in those audits.

Resolution and Receivership Activities

One of the FDIC’s key responsibilities is planning and efficiently handling the franchise marketing of failing FDIC-insured institutions and providing prompt, responsive, and efficient resolution of failed financial institutions. There has been a significant decline in bank failures over the past several years. However, planning models for responding to failing and failed institutions, including large or multiple bank failures, need to be evaluated, revisited, and tested for adequacy in light of the impact of recent corporate and external events. These include FDIC downsizing activities, the continued threat of terrorist-related activities, and natural disasters that change the operating environment in which FDIC resources must react.

In addition, the Division of Resolutions and Receiverships (DRR) faces other challenges from an information system enhancement project, the Asset Servicing Technology Enhancement Project (ASTEP), which is intended to create an integrated solution to meet the FDIC’s current and future asset servicing responsibilities based on industry standards, best practices, and adaptable technology. Successfully implementing ASTEP is an important aspect of DRR mission achievement.

DRR’s Pre-closing Planning Process

During the reporting period, we audited DRR’s pre-closing planning process for resolving troubled and failed FDIC-insured financial depository institutions.

Based on our survey work, we found that DRR had a structured and efficient bank resolution process and concluded that, overall, DRR’s pre-closing planning process was adequate. Accordingly, we decided to conclude our field work after completion of the audit survey, and we made no recommendations in this report. We did, however, suggest that in light of DRR downsizing, DRR may need to reconsider the existing internal control structure for the pre-closing planning process given the substantive changes in its operations.

We also had an ongoing audit of DRR’s ASTEP program during the reporting period, the objective of which was to determine project management effectiveness in developing and deploying the ASTEP solution.

The Office of Investigations (OI) carries out the investigative mission of the OIG. Agents in Washington, D.C.; Atlanta; Dallas; and Chicago conduct investigations of alleged criminal or otherwise prohibited activities that may harm or threaten to harm the operations or integrity of the FDIC and its programs. OI also operates an Electronic Crimes Unit (ECU) and laboratory in Washington, D.C. The ECU is responsible for conducting computer-related investigations impacting the FDIC, including employee cases involving computer abuse, and providing computer forensic support to investigations nationwide. OI also manages the OIG Hotline for employees, contractors, and others to report allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement via a toll-free number or e-mail. We concentrate our investigative efforts on those cases of most significance or potential impact to the FDIC and its programs. The goal, in part, is to bring a halt to the fraudulent conduct under investigation, protect the FDIC and other victims from further harm, and assist the FDIC in recovery of its losses. Another consideration in dedicating resources to these cases is the need to pursue appropriate criminal penalties not only to punish the offender but to deter others from participating in similar crimes.

Currently, 73 percent of our caseload is comprised of investigations involving financial institution fraud. The focus of our work in this area is on FDIC-supervised institutions Fraud by officers, directors, or insiders Obstruction of examinations Fraud leading to the failure of the institution Fraud impacting multiple institutions Fraud involving monetary losses that could significantly impact the institution Investigative Statistics April 1, 2005 – September 30, 2005 Judicial Actions: Number Indictments/Informations 22 Convictions 19 OIG Investigations Resulted In: Amount Fines of $13,000 Restitution of $4,932,490 Other Monetary Recoveries of $463,895 Total $5,409,385 Cases Referred to the Department of Justice (U.S. Attorney) 29 Referrals to FDIC Management 1 OIG Cases Conducted Jointly with Other Agencies 80

As referenced earlier in this report, many of these cases address instances of failed corporate governance. That is, in a number of situations, the senior executives of the financial institution are involved in unscrupulous activities that cause serious problems and even failures of the institutions. In addition to pursuing financial institution-related cases, the OIG commits resources to investigations that target fraud by FDIC debtors seeking to conceal their assets from the FDIC. These cases made up 15 percent of our caseload as of September 30, 2005. The FDIC was owed more than $1.7 billion in criminal restitution as of September 30, 2005. In most instances, the individuals subject to these restitution orders do not have the means to pay. The focus of OIG investigations in this area is on those individuals who do have the means to pay, but hide their assets and/or lie about their ability to pay. OI works closely with the Division of Resolutions and Receiverships (DRR) and the Legal Division in aggressively pursuing investigations of these individuals.

[ ] [ D ]

Although currently only about 5 percent of our caseload, the OIG must commit resources to investigations of criminal or serious misconduct on the part of FDIC employees. These are among the most sensitive of OIG cases and are critical to ensure the integrity of, and public confidence in, FDIC operations. Other cases may address consumer protection matters, such as misrepresentations regarding FDIC affiliation or insurance. Several such cases are described later in this section.

Joint Efforts

The OIG works closely with U.S. Attorneys’ Offices throughout the country in attempting to bring to justice individuals who have defrauded the FDIC. The prosecutorial skills and outstanding direction provided by Assistant U.S. Attorneys with whom we work are critical to our success. The results we are reporting for the last 6 months reflect the efforts in the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices in the Central District of Illinois, District of Colorado, District of Nebraska, District of Connecticut, District of Minnesota, District of South Carolina, Northern District of Texas, Northern District of Iowa, District of New Mexico, Northern District of Mississippi, Western District of Oklahoma, District of Alaska, and the Eastern District of Virginia. In addition to working with local U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, the OIG worked with trial Attorneys from the Fraud Section of the U.S. Department of Justice and State Prosecutors from the Missouri Attorney General’s Office.

Results

Over the last 6 months, OI opened 33 new cases and closed 18 cases, leaving 130 cases underway at the end of the period. Our work during the period led to indictments or criminal charges against 22 individuals and convictions of 19 defendants. Criminal charges remained pending against 34 individuals as of the end of the reporting period. Fines, restitutions, and recoveries resulting from our cases totaled $5,409,385.

The following are highlights of some of the results from our investigative activity over the last 6 months.

Fraud Arising at or Impacting Financial Institutions

Three Businessmen Charged in $8 Million Real Estate “Land Flip” Scheme
A federal grand jury in the Central District of Illinois returned an 11-count superseding indictment adding a third businessman to a rental real estate land flipping scheme in Decatur, Illinois. The 11-count superseding indictment charged the three businessmen with bank fraud, mail fraud, money laundering, and wire fraud.

From 1999 through 2005, the defendants allegedly engaged in a real estate land flipping scheme to defraud real estate lenders, including Central Illinois Bank, Champaign, Illinois, an FDIC-insured institution, buyers and sellers. The scheme involved more than 150 fraudulent real estate sales and financing transactions totaling more than $8 million in fraud against financial institutions.

The superseding indictment alleged that the defendants used fraudulent appraisals to buy, sell, and finance properties at prices fraudulently inflated. Two of the defendants falsely represented themselves as property managers who were in the business of buying, selling, and managing real estate. The third defendant was a licensed real estate appraiser who allegedly performed numerous appraisals for the two defendants in which he falsely inflated the value of the real estate.

To carry out the scheme, two of the defendants recruited buyers, typically of modest means with little or no experience in rental real estate investment. To entice the buyers, the two defendants allegedly made one or more representations to them regarding prospective properties:

	they would be paid as much as $5,000 for each property purchased;
	they could purchase properties for no money down;
	the properties were worth the appraised amounts;
	assistance would be provided in making loan applications to mortgage lenders;
	the two defendants would act as the buyer’s property manager, and would locate tenants and collect the rents;
	the two defendants would make the loan payments directly to the mortgage lenders; and
	the two defendants would buy back the properties on a contract for deed.

The two businessmen allegedly made more than $3 million for their personal use and to promote the scheme, while the real estate appraiser received fees of $350 to $450 per appraisal.

Joint investigation by the FDIC OIG, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service and the FBI; prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Central District of Illinois.

Jury Finds Two Defendants Guilty in Connection with BestBank Failure
After a 3-week trial in the U.S. District Court in Denver, the owners of Century Financial Services, Inc., and its successor, Century Financial Group, Inc., were found guilty by a federal jury on charges of bank fraud, wire fraud, filing false bank reports, and continuing a financial crimes enterprise in connection with the 1998 failure of BestBank, Boulder, Colorado.

BestBank entered into agreements with Century Financial and the defendants to market BestBank credit cards to subprime borrowers. Century Financial sold $498 travel club memberships, marketed first through Universal Tour Travel Club and later through All Around Travel Club. In almost every instance, those who signed up for the travel club did not pay cash for their membership. Instead, BestBank and Century Financial offered to finance a travel club membership for subprime borrowers using a newly issued BestBank VISA credit card. The credit limit for the subprime borrowers as provided by the bank was $600. BestBank also charged fees, which immediately brought the borrowers close to the credit limit. Less than half of those who signed up for the travel club received even their membership materials.

The jury found that the defendants carried out a fraudulent scheme in several ways. Most people did not pay the mandatory $20 fee required before the account was funded. Over 50 percent of the subprime borrowers’ accounts were non-performing. The defendants and Century Financial fraudulently concealed the subprime borrowers’ non-performance and delinquency rates by reporting non-performing accounts as performing. The defendants paid $20 to some accounts so they would appear to be performing when in fact they were not. Also charged in the BestBank failure are the former owner, chief executive officer and chairman of the board of directors; the former president and director; the former chief financial officer and director. The case against these three defendants is pending and no trial date has been set.

The defendants each received more than $5 million during the course of the fraudulent scheme. Each of them faces a possible mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years to life in federal prison and fines of up to twice the amount gained from committing the offense.

Joint investigation by the FDIC OIG, the FBI, and the IRS CID; prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Colorado and the U.S. Department of Justice.

Former Vice President of Bank of Sierra Blanca Arrested on Bank Fraud Charges
A federal grand jury in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas returned a 21-count indictment against the former vice president of Bank of Sierra Blanca (BSB), Sierra Blanca, Texas. The grand jury charged the defendant with 1 count of bank fraud and 20 counts of misapplication of bank funds.

By way of background, on January 18, 2002, the Bank of Sierra Blanca was closed, and the receiving bank, Security State Bank of Pecos was renamed TransPecos Sierra Blanca Bank. The indictment alleges that from about 1995 until November 2001, the defendant devised a scheme to fraudulently obtain money, funds, credits, assets, securities, and other property owned by and under the control of the Bank of Sierra Blanca. The defendant allegedly abused her position of trust within the bank, lied to bank personnel and customers, made false entries in bank records, and stole bank money and credit. The defendant allegedly misapplied money from the accounts of the bank by various means, including over drafting checking accounts, obtaining funds through unauthorized transfers, using bank and customers’ funds to pay personal debts and debts of others, and causing the bank to pay unauthorized interest rates on deposits. The indictment further alleged that the defendant attempted to conceal her activities by making false entries in the bank’s accounting system, creating a fictitious account under her control, and misapplying additional money and credit from other accounts of the bank and using those funds to replenish accounts victimized by previous thefts.

Through her scheme, the defendant allegedly converted approximately $1.2 million belonging to the bank and its customers for her personal use.

Joint investigation by the FDIC OIG and the FBI; prosecuted by the U. S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Texas.

Former President of Deuel County State Bank Sentenced to 4 Years in Prison
The former president of the Deuel County State Bank (DCSB), Chappell, Nebraska, was sentenced in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska. Earlier, the defendant pleaded guilty to a one-count bill of information charging him with bank fraud. He received 4 years’ imprisonment, 5 years’ supervised probation upon release, and was ordered to pay $1.9 million in restitution.

This case was initiated based on information reported by DSC and DRR indicating that DCSB, an institution supervised by the Federal Reserve was near failure as a result of a check kiting and fraudulent loan scheme perpetrated by the defendant. The kiting was conducted between DCSB and a sister institution, Haxtun Community Bank,Haxtun, Colorado, an FDIC-insured institution. The losses from the scheme were approximately $1.8 million. The defendant admitted that between August 27, 2001, and July 30, 2003, he defrauded DCSB by making approximately $745,000 in loans to himself without board approval. This amount exceeded the bank’s limits of money that can be loaned to bank insiders. As part of the defendant’s plea agreement, he stipulated to an action under Section 8(e) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, which provides a lifetime ban from banking.

Joint investigation by the FDIC OIG, FBI, and Federal Reserve Board OIG; prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Nebraska.

Former Bank President of Connecticut Bank of Commerce Pleads Guilty
The former president of Connecticut Bank of Commerce, Stamford, Connecticut, pleaded guilty in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut to a one-count criminal information charging him with misapplication of bank funds.

According to the information, the defendant, at the direction of the former chairman of the Connecticut Bank of Commerce board of directors, caused a $1.35 million loan to be made to an entity known as Moore Advisors, Inc. (Moore), and further caused the loan proceeds to be wired to a bank account held in the company’s name. At the time the loan was made, the defendant knew that no Board approval had been obtained for the loan, which was required; knew he had no documentation to suggest that Moore had any assets, income, or other means to support the loan; and knew that the natural effect of his actions was to put the bank at substantial risk of loss.

The former chairman of the Connecticut Bank of Commerce board of directors was sentenced in January 2005 to 51 months’ incarceration and 36 months’ supervised release after pleading guilty to one count of misapplication of bank funds. No criminal restitution was ordered by the court because the parties agreed that the former chairman’s payment of $8.5 million to the FDIC as part of his settlement of the agency’s administrative charges satisfied all losses directly related to his criminal conduct.

Joint investigation by the FDIC and FBI; prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Connecticut.

Former Bank President at Town & Country Bank Sentenced and Former State of Minnesota Representative Found Guilty in Bank Failure
The former president of Town & Country Bank of Almelund (T&C Bank), Almelund, Minnesota, was sentenced in the District of Minnesota to 18 months’ incarceration with 3 years’ supervised release and was ordered to pay $1.35 million in restitution to the FDIC.

The defendant earlier pleaded guilty to 1 count of conspiracy to commit bank fraud and 1 count of money laundering of an 11-count superseding indictment charging him with bank fraud, money laundering, false bank entries, and conspiracy. The superseding indictment alleged that the defendant and others executed a scheme to defraud the former T&C Bank by manipulating over 20 false lines of credit that resulted in the failure of the bank in July 2000 when the State of Minnesota declared the bank insolvent and appointed the FDIC as receiver. The failure of T&C Bank resulted in an estimated loss of $3.4 million to the FDIC Bank Insurance Fund.

Former State of Minnesota Representative Found Guilty
After a 2-week trial in July 2005 in the District of Minnesota, a former State of Minnesota Representative was found guilty on two counts of mail fraud and one count of money laundering in connection with his activity with the former T&C Bank. He was found not guilty on two other counts of mail fraud, one other count of money laundering, and one count of conspiracy.

During the Representative’s tenure in the Minnesota House, he served as the chairman of the House Regulated Industries Committee, which oversaw the legislation regarding utility companies. According to the indictment, the Representative used his position to enact legislation permitting utility companies to use energy conservation funds for research and development projects. Once the legislation was enacted, he used his position to coerce the utility companies to pay $650,000 in grants to Northern Pole, a Minnesota corporation created to recycle old utility poles. The Representative had a significant equity stake in Northern Pole.

The Representative had a personal and business relationship with the former president of T&C Bank. As alleged in the indictment, the two devised a scheme whereby the defendant would invest in Northern Pole, a troubled credit of T&C Bank. The scheme involved borrowing money from T&C Bank in the name of the Representative’s other businesses, diverting those funds to Northern Pole and other troubled credits of the bank, and using State of Minnesota grant money to pay back the debt service on the loans.

Throughout this investigation, OIG agents have been coordinating with DSC, DRR, and the Legal Division.

Joint investigation by the FDIC OIG, the FBI, and the IRS CID; prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Minnesota.

Owners of Stardancer Casinos, Inc. Indicted on Tax Fraud
In the District of South Carolina, Florence Division, the owners of Stardancer Casinos, Inc., (Stardancer) of Duluth, Georgia, were charged in an 18-count indictment with tax fraud for the period April 2001 to November 2002.

The president and chief executive officer of Stardancer and the executive vice president operated casino boats in Little River, South Carolina, and several locations in Florida from February 1999 through January 2003. The defendants were charged with withholding employment taxes from Stardancer employees’ payroll checks and failing to pay those taxes to the U.S. government, resulting in a loss to the government of approximately $1.15 million.

The investigation into Stardancer was initiated in February 2002, when the former president of the Oakwood Deposit Bank Company, Oakwood, Ohio, confessed to embezzling over $40 million from Oakwood Deposit Bank Company, which led to the bank’s insolvency. The former president admitted that most of the money was embezzled to Stardancer. Investigators eventually determined that over $43 million was embezzled to Stardancer and ultimately shut down the company in January 2003, with the execution of search warrants and seizure of Stardancer’s gambling vessels and shuttle craft. The former president pleaded guilty to embezzlement and money laundering and was sentenced to 14 years’ imprisonment and was ordered to pay $48,718,405 in restitution.

Additional Indictments

Four Business Associates Charged in $2.16 Million Real Estate Fraud Scheme
A federal grand jury in the Northern District of Texas returned a seven-count indictment against three business associates employed by BetterHomes of Dallas and an employee of American Title and Capital Title of Dallas. The seven-count indictment charged the four defendants with bank fraud, mail fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy.

The indictment alleged that from December 2002 through March 2004, the four defendants engaged in a real estate scheme to defraud various real estate lenders, buyers, and sellers, including Fremont Investment and Loan, an FDIC-supervised institution. The indictment alleged that the three defendants from BetterHomes of Dallas recruited straw purchasers and borrowers to purchase and finance single-family residences they had located and submitted fraudulent loan documents to the lenders in the name of the straw borrowers indicating the down payment for the loans had been made by the borrowers. The employee of the title company would release the loan proceeds early to the three defendants from BetterHomes, who would then purchase cashiers’ checks in the name of the straw borrowers to obtain loans in an amount greater than the value of the residences. The indictment further alleged that the defendants caused inflated loan amounts to be funded by mortgage lenders and financial institutions, and conspired to distribute the fraudulently obtained loan proceeds among themselves and others. The three defendants also executed contracts between their company, BetterHomes of Dallas, and the straw borrowers stating the company would be responsible for the loans, but they failed to fulfill their contract.

Joint investigation by the FDIC OIG and the FBI; prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Texas.

Former Vice President of Republic Bank Indicted on Bank Fraud
The Grand Jury in the U.S. District Court for Minnesota indicted the former vice president and loan officer of Republic Bank, Duluth, Minnesota, on one count of bank fraud.

This case was initiated based on a referral from DSC, Kansas City, following the defendant’s removal from Republic Bank. The indictment alleged that the defendant made a series of fraudulent loans that benefited him personally and caused a loss to Republic Bank of approximately $608,000. The defendant allegedly embezzled the funds by using a variety of fictitious loans, nominee loans, and fraudulent loans to family members. He also allegedly forged a number of bank officers’ signatures on documents and created false documents to support loan fund disbursements. He is also charged with converting two repossessed automobiles to his own use.

Joint investigation by the FDIC OIG and FBI; prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Minnesota.

Former Executive Vice President of Iowa-Nebraska State Bank Indicted
The former executive vice president of Iowa-Nebraska State Bank, South Sioux City, Nebraska, converted $125,000 in an unsecured loan to a bank customer and falsely stated that the purpose of the loan was for “operating expenses” and “for the purchase (down payment) of video lottery machines” when in fact the defendant knew that the borrower was going to transfer the loan proceeds back to him. The defendant used the proceeds of the loan for his personal benefit, including paying off his two daughters’ car loans. The defendant was indicted in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Iowa on two counts of making false entries in bank records.

Joint investigation by the FDIC OIG and the FBI; prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Iowa.

Guilty Pleas

Former Officer of New Mexico Bank Pleads Guilty to Bank Fraud
A former assistant vice president of Citizens Bank, Farmington, New Mexico, pleaded guilty in the District of New Mexico to a one-count information charging her with bank fraud. The defendant admitted to submitting fraudulent debit and credit tickets, which caused funds to be credited to an inactive customer bank account. After the inactive account was credited with the funds, the defendant transferred the funds to her personal bank accounts. She continued her scheme by requesting cash from bank tellers and then submitting fraudulent debit and credit tickets to cover up and balance the transactions. Losses attributed to this scheme resulted in approximately $667,658 being fraudulently obtained from Citizens Bank.

Joint investigation by the FDIC OIG and FBI; prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of New Mexico.

Former President of Garnavillo Savings Bank Pleads Guilty to Bank Fraud
The former president of Garnavillo Savings Bank, Garnavillo, Texas, pleaded guilty in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Iowa to a one-count information charging him with bank fraud. He admitted to executing a scheme between 1996 and 2003 to embezzle funds of more than $157,000 from Garnavillo Savings Bank. As part of his plea agreement, the former president stipulated to an action under Section 8(e) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, which provides a lifetime ban from banking, and he also agreed to pay $157,009 in restitution.

Joint investigation by the FDIC OIG and FBI; prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Iowa.

Bank Customer Pleads Guilty to Bank Fraud
A bank customer from Omaha, Nebraska, pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud in the U.S. District Court of Nebraska. In February 2004 the defendant was indicted on charges from a check-kiting scheme he engaged in during 2000. The indictment alleged that the defendant kited checks between accounts maintained at Nebraska State Bank and Mid-City Bank for his personal and business purposes. Losses from the check-kite totaled approximately $2.7 million.

DSC provided the information leading to the joint investigation by the FDIC OIG and FBI; prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Nebraska.

Bank Borrower Pleads Guilty to Bank Fraud
A borrower at the State Bank of Belle Plaine, Belle Plaine, Minnesota, pleaded guilty in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota to a one-count information charging her with bank fraud. The defendant participated in the accounts receivable purchase loan program with the State Bank of Belle Plaine and admitted to creating and submitting fraudulent invoices causing the bank to advance approximately $107,000 on false invoices.

Joint investigation by the FDIC OIG, FBI, and U.S. Secret Service; prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Minnesota.

Sentencings

Bank Customer Sentenced in Bank of Falkner’s Failure
In the continuing investigation of the September 2000 failure of the Bank of Falkner, Falkner, Mississippi, a bank customer was sentenced in the Northern District of Mississippi to serve 36 months in prison followed by 60 months of supervised release. He was also ordered to pay restitution to the FDIC in the amount of $1.16 million. The bank customer’s sentence resulted from an earlier guilty plea to a two-count criminal information charging him with making and causing false entries in the books, reports, and statements of the Bank of Falkner, with respect to a series of nominee loans he received. He was also charged with money laundering in connection with his use of the p